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In the last ten years, representatives of domestic producers, trade associations, and unions filed approximately 800
petitions with the U.S. Department of Commerce ("the Commerce Department") and the U.S. International Trade Commission ("the Commission") alleging that their clients were
materially injured by dumped 1 or subsidized imports. 2 Once
a petition is filed, the Commerce Department begins the task
of determining whether the imports are in fact being
dumped or subsidized, and if so, to what extent. 3 The
amount of dumping or the size of the subsidy expressed as a
percentage of the price of the imported product is called the
"dumping margin" or the "subsidy margin." If the imports
are being dumped or are receiving a countervailable subsidy,4 the Commission must determine whether the domestic
industry, represented by the petitioners, has been thereby
injured. 5 When the Commission makes its determination,
they may not consider any benefits to consumers of the domestic or imported products from lower prices. 6 If both the
Commerce Department and the Commission make affirmative determinations, the United States Customs Service
("Customs") will impose an antidumping or countervailing
l. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
2. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT '88, at 36 (1989);j.
Finger and T. Murray, Policing Unfair Imports: The United States Example 2 n.l (Februrary 20, 1990) (there were 774 antidumping and countervailing duty cases from 1980 through 1988) (available in the author's file
at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York University School of Law).
3. 19 u.s.c. § 1671b(b) (1982).
4. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
5. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167l(a)(2), 1673(2) (1982).
6. See generally Applebaum & Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and Antidumping
Actions Under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 56 ANTITRUST LJ.
497, 508-09 (1987) (dumping does not have to have an anticompetitive
impact); Sykes, "Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective," 89
Columbia L. Rev. 199 (1989) (criticizing countervailing duty law for not
promoting efficiency).
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duty on the imports equal to the dumping or subsidy margin
as calculated by the Commerce Department. 7
These investigations are expensive for the parties and
the federal government to litigate. 8 The impact of the Commission's decisions on domestic producers, foreign producers, importers, and consumers is far greater. 9 Nevertheless,
in spite of the large number of investigations and the substantial effects the Commission's determinations have
around the world, the Commission lacks a consistent, analytically sound framework guiding its determinations. In this
Article, I will propose and describe such a framework and
argue that this framework is consistent with both the intent
of Congress when it enacted the current law and United
States international obligations. 10 In contrast to the proposed framework, the framework traditionally used by the
Commission is inconsistent with basic economic principles,
Congressional intent and United States international obliga7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167l(a), 1673 (1982). As a matter of terminology,
countervailing duties apply to subsidized imports, and antidumping duties
apply to dumped imports.
8. See General Accounting Office, Pursuit of the Trade Law Remedies
by Small Business 7-9 ( 1988) (the cost to petitioners of pursuing antidumping cases generally ranges from $150,000 to $550,000 and is slightly
less for a countervailing duty case); Rugman, U.S. Protectionism and Canadian Trade Policy, 20 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 363, 368, 372 (1986); U.S. INT'L
TRADE CoMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT '88, at 20 (1989) (the Commission's 1988
budget was $34,750,000).
9. See generally Elzinga, Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist's
Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 439,442 (1987). An individual case can have
a large impact. As a result of the Commission's decision in Antifriction
Bearings (other than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2185, Inv.
Nos. 303-TA-19, -20 and 731-TA-391 through 399 (1989) (final), approximately $500 million in annual imports of antifriction bearings, widely used
in the aircraft, automotive, and construction industries will face antidumping and countervailing duties. BNA, Large Dumping Margins Found by
ITA on Bearing Imports from 9 Countries, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. 393 (Mar.
29, 1989). Because the average estimated duty exceeds 60 percent, the
order will force importers to post cash deposits with Customs of around
$300 million a year to cover anticipated duties. BNA, lTC Finds American
Industry Materially Injured by Three Classes of Dumped Bearings, 6 INT'L
TRADE REP. 553 (May 3, 1989).
10. Previous drafts of this Article have been circulated within and without the Commission and several commissioners use elements of the proposed approach.
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tions. 11
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows:
The next section provides a brief introduction into the economics and the law of dumping and subsidies and describes
the Commission's traditional approach to injury. The third
section introduces the proposed framework, which I call the
economic approach to injury. The fourth section provides a
mathematical model of the economic approach and derives
the relations that exist between the parameters of the model
and the injury to the domestic industry from the unfair practice. The fifth section provides the legal argument in support of the economic approach. The sixth section contains a
critical discussion of current Commission practice. The seventh section contains a critical discussion of current Commerce Department practice. The eighth section is the conclusion.

II.

THE EcoNOMics AND THE

LAw

or DuMPING

AND SUBSIDIES

In 1979, during the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 12 the delegates
adopted the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 1!'
("Subsidies Code") and the Second Antidumping Duties
II. The issue of whether the United States should have an antidumping and countervailing duty law is beyond the scope of this Article. I will
address a narrower question-how should the Commission administer the
existing antidumping and countervailing duty law?-which is a question of
statutory interpretation rather than economic policy. The Commission
bears the duty to enforce the law as it was written by Congress. However,
this does not preclude a role for economic analysis in administrative law.
For one view of the role of economics in agency interpretation and administration of law, see Wald,judicial Review of Economic Analyses, I YALE J. ON
REG. 43 (1983).
12. The GATT is an agreement among approximately 100 nations that
regulates aspects of international commerce. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187. For a compilation of GATT documents, see GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DocuMENTS (1947- ). For general discussions of the GATT, seeK. DAM,
THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); J.
jACKSON, WoRLD TRADE AND THE LAw oF THE GATT (1969).
13. Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
GATT, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.

42

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POliTICS

Code 14 ("Antidumping Code, and together with the Subsidies Code, the "Codes"). 15 Later that year, in order to bring
U.S. law into conformity with the Codes, 16 Congress passed
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("1979 Act"), which repealed the prior statutory scheme for antidumping and
countervailing duties and added a new title to the Trade Act
of 1930 ("1930 Act"). 17 This new title, Title VII, contains
the current law for the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties. 1s

,I
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The Definition of Dumping

Title VII defines dumping as the sale in the United
States of a class or kind of foreign merchandise at less than
its fair value. 19 The Commerce Department considers the
fair value of imported merchandise to be the foreign market
value of merchandise that is the same as or similar to the
merchandise that is exported to the United States. 20 Same
or similar merchandise is merchandise produced in the same
country by the same person who is exporting to the United
States and that is similar in material, purpose, and value to
the merchandise exported to the United States. 21 In order
to have a basis to compare prices, the Commerce Department calculates all prices back to the factory door. Thus, the
U.S. price is the ex-factory price of merchandise destined for
14. Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the GATT, Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650.
15. These Codes are not a treaty, but form part of an international
agreement that the United States has entered by executive agreement.
The Codes are not controlling law in the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2503,2504 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979);
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 421.
16. 19 u.s.c. § 2503 (1982).
17. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 193
(19---) (repealing Antidumping Duty Act of21, ch. 14,42 Stat. 11, amending Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 93 Stat. 151) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ I671-1677g (1982)).
18. Sandler, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19 lNT'L LAw. 761,
763-74 (1985), gives a good introduction to the antidumping and countervailing duties laws.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20. 19 C.F.R. § 353.42, .46 (1989).
21. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(16) (1982).

I
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sale in the U.S. market. 22 Similarly, the foreign-market value
is usually the ex-factory price of merchandise destined for
sale in the foreign producer's home market. 23 Dumping,
therefore, occurs when the ex-factory price of the merchandise destined for sale in the United States is less than the exfactory price of the merchandise destined for sale in the
home market. The practice of charging different prices to
different customers for the same merchandise is called price
discrimination. Consequently, dumping is a form of price
discrimination between national markets, in which a higher
price is charged at home than in the U.S. market.24
Since dumping is a form of price discrimination, the
same economic theory applies to both. 25 Thus, a rational
firm in long-run equilibrium will engage in dumping if the
following three conditions exist:
1) separate national markets prevent the
reimportation of the lower-priced exports;
2) the exporter has market power in its home
market; and
3) the exporter faces a more elastic demand
curve in the United States than in its home market.26
Before a firm in long-run equilibrium will dump, all three
conditions must be met. If any of the conditions is not met,
the exporting firm will charge the same price in the U.S. market that it charges at home. 27
A rational firm might also temporarily engage in dumping for a variety of reasons. For example, a rational firm
might engage in dumping because it is a new entrant into the
U.S. market and it is trying to build goodwill. Alternatively,
a dumping firm might be engaging in predatory pricing,
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41
(1989).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(I)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.46(a) (1989).
24. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3-9
(1923).
25. /d. at 3-4.
26. Boltuck, An Economic Analysis of Dumping, 21 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 45,
4 7 ( 1987); for a discussion of these conditions, see R. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING
LAw IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 27 (1980).
27. Boltuck, supra note 26, at 46-48.
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charging a very low price in the United States in an attempt
to drive its competitors out of the market, so it can later raise
its price and earn monopoly profits. 2s
Title VII covers two kinds of dumping, cost dumping
and price dumping. The discussion of dumping so far has
dealt with price dumping. Price dumping occurs when the
home-market price of merchandise exceeds its U.S. market
price. Cost dumping occurs when merchandise is sold in the
United States below its full cost of production. 29 Cost
dumping is likely to occur when demand is stochastic and
there are substantial fixed costs of production. Under these
conditions, when demand is strong, producers will operate at
capacity and will charge prices high enough to cover their
fixed costs of production. However, when demand is sluggish, producers will not operate at capacity and they will
charge only enough to cover their variable costs of production. Thus, when demand is sluggish, producers of products
that require large fixed costs of production, such as steel, are
likely to engage in dumping.3o
As the discussion above shows, dumping can occur for a
variety of reasons. However, the only explanation for persistent dumping is price discrimination. Because the other
forms of dumping are only temporary phenomena, price discrimination is probably the explanation for most of the
dumping that is observed.3 1

I

I.

, I

B.

The Definition of Subsidy

A subsidy is simply a bounty or grant given by a government. 32 Title VII divides subsidies into two broad classes:
domestic subsidies and export subsidies. Domestic subsidies
are subsidies that promote the production or sale of merchandise that might or might not be exported. A domestic
28. For a discussion of various explanations for short-run dumping, see
VINER, supra note 24, at 23; W. WARES, THE THEORY oF DUMPING AND
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 7-12 ( 1977).
29. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(b) (1982).
30. For a discussion of the economics of cost dumping, see Ethier,
Dumping, 90 J. PoL. EcoN. 487 (1982).
31. See G. VON HABERLER, THE THEORY oF INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH
ITS APPLICATION TO CoMMERCIAL PoLICY 296-317 (1936); see also W.
WARES, supra note 28, at I 0-12.
32. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a)(l), 1677(5) (1982).
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subsidy on goods exported to the United States is
countervailable by the United States if the subsidy is available only to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries. A subsidy that is available to all enterprises or industries in a country, such as public roads and
public schools, is considered to be generally available, and is
therefore not countervailable. 3 3
Included in Title VII's sweep of countervailable domestic subsidies are research and development subsidies, subsidies to factors of production, equity infusions on non-commercial terms, loan guaranties, and loans with below-market
interest rates. 34 The Commerce Department values a sub35
sidy at the net amount that is received by the producer. In
calculating the net value of the subsidy, the Commerce Department does not subtract any costs incurred by the recipient in order to be eligible for the subsidy. Thus, for example, the cost to a foreign producer of moving its plant to another region will not be considered in calculating the net
subsidy. This cost will be excluded from the calculation even
if the subsidy was conditioned on the producer relocating its
plant and only covered the recipient's actual relocation expenses.36
In addition to domestic subsidies, Title VII also includes
export subsidies within its list of countervailable subsidies. 37
The defining characteristic of an export subsidy is that the
subsidy gives preferential treatment to goods that are exported as opposed to goods that are sold in the exporter's
home market. Export subsidies are countervailable regard33. See Non-Rubber Footwear from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 992
(1984).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii).
35. /d. §§ 1303(a)(1), 1677(6). The Commerce Department has recently proposed new regulations codifying its methodology for determining whether subsidy exists, measuring its value, and allocating that value
over time. 54 Fed. Reg. 23366 (May 31, 1989).
36. Cf H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979); S. REP.
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 381, 471.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982). The GAIT defines an export subsidy as a subsidy, either direct or indirect, on exports. Protocol Amending
the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Mar. 10, 1955, art. XVI, para. 4, 8 U.S.T. 1767, 1777, T.I.A.S. No.
3930, at 11, 278 U.N.T.S. 168, 184.

-
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less of whether they are generally available or not in the
country where they were given. 38
The method used by the Commerce Department to
measure a subsidy is the per unit value of the subsidy received by the producer. This is not always equal to the per
unit reduction in marginal cost. The per unit value of the
subsidy received can be less than, greater than, or equal to
the per unit reduction in the marginal cost of producing the
good caused by subsidy. In graphic terms, the reduction in
the cost of producing the good is depicted as a shift in the
import supply curve. 39 For example, if Lilliput provided Lilliputian widget manufacturers with a subsidy of $1 for each
widget they produced, the subsidy would reduce the cost of
producing each widget by $1 and shift the import supply
curve by $1. Such a subsidy will be referred to as a full passthrough subsidy because the per unit value of the subsidy
and the per unit shift in the marginal cost curve are equal. 40
For many subsidies, however, less than the full amount
of the subsidy will be passed through to the import supply
curve. For example, assume that the Lilliputian government
recently decided to subsidize widget production by providing widget manufacturers with a subsidy of $1 for each hour
of labor used in the production of widgets. Assume further,
before the subsidy was granted one half hour of labor was
used along with 3.25 units of capital to produce one widget.
The subsidy, by reducing the relative price of labor, caused
widget producers to use labor more intensively and capital
less intensively; one hour of labor is used along with 2 units
of capital to produce one widget. Under these assumptions,
the value of the subsidy received by the recipient, as calculated by the Commerce Department, will be $1 a widget. At
the pre-subsidy level of labor usage, the subsidy would have
reduced the cost of producing a widget by only $.50. The
38. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982).
39. The phrase "import supply curve" will be used to refer to a foreign
producer's excess supply curve to the United States. From the perspective
of the foreign producer, it is an export supply curve. From the perspective
of the United States, it is an import supply curve. Either term could have
been used; because the antidumping and countervailing duty law is concerned with effects on U.S. markets, I will use the term which represents
the U.S. perspective.
40. See infra p. 59, diagram l.

i

~r~~~t8lltr"•~,,,.,,.
'I

f

1989]

AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

47

subsidy, however, by causing an increase in the intensity of
labor also caused a decrease in the marginal productivity of
labor, thereby leading to a reduction of between $.50 and $1
in the cost of producing a widget as a result of the subsidy.
For example, assume that the unsubsidized wage rate is
$3.00 an hour and that the price of capital is $1.00 a unit.
Before the subsidy went into effect producers used one half
hour of labor, which cost $1.50, and 3.25 units of capital,
which cost $3.25, to produce one widget at a total cost of
$4.75. Producers did not use 1 hour of labor and 2 units of
capital to produce a widget because it would have cost $5.00
to produce a widget. If the producers had stayed with their
original factor proportions after the subsidy became available, it would have cost $4.25 to produce a widget, thereby
reducing the cost of production by $.50. However, by shifting their factor proportions, producers were able to reduce
the cost of production to $4.00, which is a saving of $.75 a
widget over the initial cost ofproduction. This $.75 saving is
the shift in the import supply curve because of the subsidy.
The Commerce Department, however, calculates the subsidy
to be $1.00 a widget because the cost of producing a widget
using the post-subsidy factor proportions and pre-subsidy
prices would be $1.00 more than the cost using the post-subsidy factor proportions and the post-subsidy prices.
Although the above example applies to only one special case,
the principle, that a subsidy to a factor of production reduces
the cost of production by an amount greater than the savings
at the old factor proportions but less than the savings at the
new factor proportions, is generally true. 41
The rest of this Article will focus primarily on full passthrough subsidies, because, as is shown in Section VII, when
the Commission uses the Commerce Department's calculations of the dumping and subsidy margins to estimate the
effect the unfair practice had on the import supply curve, the
proposed analysis will work exactly only for a subsidy that is
41. For a discussion of this principle, see G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
PRICE ch. 7 (3d ed. 1966); see also Memorandum from Industry Economist,
Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission, to Commissioner Brunsdale, EC:J-225 (May 29, 1986) (available in the author's file at
the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York University School of Law).
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19:

completely passed through to the import supply curve. 42
C.

The Domestic Industry and the Determination of Injury

In every investigation, the Commission begins its analysis with the imported product that is allegedly either being
dumped or benefitting from a subsidy. 43 The Commission's
first task is to define the like product: the product that "is
like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics
and uses with" the imported product. 44 The like product determination has proved troublesome for the Commission
when the investigated product is part of a continuum of similar products. 45 Essentially, the like product is the closest domestically-produced substitute for the imported product. 46
The producers of the like product constitute the domestic
industry. 47 The Commission's injury determination is based
on the domestic industry's production of the like product. 48
The statutory language of Title VII requires the Commission to make a final determination of whether (A) an industry in the United States (i) is materially injured, or

I

42. See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text.
43. Although all dumping allegations go to the Commission, not all
subsidy allegations go to the Commission. In general, only those countries that have signed the Subsidies Code or have adopted obligations similar to those contained in the Subsidies Code are entitled to an injury test
for subsidized imports. Subsidized imports from countries that are not
entitled to an injury test are automatically countervailed if Commerce
makes an affirmative determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982).
44. /d. § 1677(10).
45. See, e.g., Certain Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Japan,
USITC Pub. 1224 lnv. No. 731-TA-87, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1871 (1982)
(preliminary); see also Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United
States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L LJ. 345, 392-99 (1985).
46. The like product is generally limited to the closest substitute on the
demand side. Substitutes on the supply side for the domestic like product
are generally excluded. See Perry, supra note 44, at 393. For a recent criticism of the Commission's definition of like product and industry as being
too narrow and technical, see Note, Economically Meaningful Markets: AnAlternative Approach to Defining 'Like Product' and 'Domestic Industry ' Under The
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 73 VA. L. REv. 1459 (1987).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987).

48. There are a few instances in which the Commission can use a
broader or narrower definition of industry to assess injury. See id.
§ 1677(4)(B)-(D).
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(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded, by reason of imports,
or sales (or the likelihood of sales) for importation,
of the merchandise with respect to which the [Commerce Department] has made an affirmative deter•
•
mmat10n
.... 49
Material injury is present injury and is defined as "harm
which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. " 50
A threat of material injury is prospective injury. For a finding that an industry is threatened with material injury, the
threat must be real and the actual injury must be imminent
and not based on mere conjecture. 51 The third category of
injury, material retardation, requires a finding by the Commission that an industry did not develop in the United States
by reason of the unfairly traded imports. 52 Material retardation is rarely an issue before the Commission.
In making its determination, the statute directs the
Commission to consider among other factors (i) the volume of imports of the merchandise
which is the subject of the investigation,
(ii) the effect of imports on that merchandise
on prices in the United States for like products, and
(iii) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like products, but
only in the context of production operations within
the United States. 5 S
The statutory directions do not end here as the statute provides further elaboration on each of the three enumerated
factors:
(i) Volume.-In evaluating the volume of im49. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
52. Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada, USITC Pub. 1711, Inv.
No. 731-TA-199, at 4-5, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2353, 2355 (1985) (final). For a
short, but thoughtful discussion of this case, see Palmeter, Material Retardation in the Establishment of an Industry Standard in Antidumping Cases, 21 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 113 (1987).
53. 19 U.S.C. § l677(7)(B) (1982), as amended by the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) [hereinafter Trade Bill].
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ports of merchandise, the Commission shall consider whether the volume of imports of the merchandise, or any increase in that volume, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States, is significant.
(ii) Price.-In evaluating the effect of imports
of such merchandise on prices, the Commission
shall consider whether(1) there has been significant price underselling by the imported merchandise as compared with the price of like products of the
United States, and
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a significant degree or prevents price increases, which
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant
degree.
(iii) Impact on affected domestic industry.In examining the impact required to be considered
under subparagraph (B)(iii), the Commission shall
evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a
bearing on the state of the industry in the United
States, including, but not limited to(1) actual and potential decline in output,
sales, market share, profits, productivity, return
on investments, and utilization of capacity;
(II) factors affecting domestic prices,
(III) actual and potential negative effects
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to raise capital, and investment,
and
(IV) actual and potential negative effects
on the existing development and production
efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced
version of the like product. 54
Although Title VII provides the Commission with a list of
factors to consider in its analysis, the statute does not pro54. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii) (1982), as amended by Trade Bill, supra
note 53, § 1328.
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vide a method by which such analysis should be conducted.
Congress left that choice to the discretion of the Commission: "The determination of the lTC with respect to causation is ... complex and difficult, and is a matter for the judgment of the lTC. " 55 Thus the statute and the accompanying
legislative history simply instruct the Commission to "consider" and "evaluate" various factors. 5 6
D.

The Commissions Traditional Approach to the Determination
of Injury

Since the 1979 Act went into effect, fourteen commissioners have served on the Commission and no two have had
exactly the same interpretation of Title VII. Nevertheless,
there are some common elements that run through a majority of the commissioners' opinions. In the discussion that
follows, I refer to these elements as "the traditional approach" to injury.57
The traditional approach begins with the bifurcation of
injury and causation. The Commission first determines
whether the domestic industry is experiencing material injury. Only if the Commission concludes that the domestic
industry is in a state of material injury will the Commission
consider whether dumped or subsidized imports are a cause
55. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1979).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1982), as amended by Trade Bill, supra note
53, § 1328; see Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Plates and Sheets from Argentina, USITC Pub. 2089, Inv. No. 731-TA-175, at 31-35, lO I.T.R.D. (BNA)
2142, 2154-56 (1988) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final, second remand); E.
Easton, The Commission's Injury Investigations: Opportunities for More
Effective Judicial Review 28 (Oct. 24, 1986) (presented at the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade) (available in the author's file at the offices of the journal of International Law and
Politics, New York University School of Law); DeGrandis, Proving Causation
in Antidumping Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 563, 564 (1986). Some of the factors
listed in the statute focus directly on the injury to the domestic industry
whereas others may be used to help infer the injury. See 3.5 Inch
Microdisks and Media Therefor from Japan, US lTC Pub. 2076, Inv. No.
731-TA-389, at 71 (Apr. 1988) (Cass, Comm'r) (preliminary).
57. A detailed description of the Commission and its antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations is given by Perry, supra note 45, at 378430. Excluded are former Commissioners Liebeler and Stern as well as
the two current commissioners who use the economic approach: Commissioner Brunsdale, who calls her version elasticity analysis, and Commissioner Cass, who calls his version the comparative or unitary approach.
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of that injury. 58 The first test is referred to as the injury test
and the second as the causation test. 59 According to the
traditional approach, the Commission makes an affirmative
determination only if there are both injury and causation.

1.

II,,

I
I

I

I

I

The Injury Test

The traditional, bifurcated approach to the determination of injury begins with a discussion of the condition of the
domestic industry. The Commission assesses this by looking
at the industry as it is today, and then comparing the current
state of the industry to the state of the industry several years
before the petition was filed. In examining the current state
of the industry, the Commission looks to see if the firms are
unprofitable or if profit levels are low, and it looks to see if
firms are either leaving the industry or closing plants. Any of
these conditions is considered to be evidence of material injury.60
The Commission also compares the conditions in the industry today with that of three years ago. If employment,
production, prices, capacity, and returns on equity and assets
today are below their levels three years ago, this will also be
considered evidence of material injury. 61 Under the tradi58. See Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate from Taiwan, USITC
Pub. 2032, Inv. No. 731-TA-371, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1469 (1987) (final)
(negative determination based on independent grounds of no injury and
no causation). Compare Portland Hydraulic Cement from Columbia,
France, Greece, USITC Pub. 1925, lnv. Nos. 731-TA-356 to -363, 9
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1663 (1986) (preliminary) (negative determination based
on finding that domestic industry not experiencing injury without address- '
ing causation issue) with Hydrogenated Castor Oil from Brazil, USITC
Pub. 1804, Inv. No. 731-TA-236, at 3, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1565, 1568-69
( 1986) (final) (negative determination based on finding that LTFV imports
were not a cause of material injury domestic industry was experiencing).
59. Also, the Commission's determination, as opposed to the Commerce Department's determination, is sometimes called the injury test.
The definition of the injury test encompasses both the narrower definition
of the injury test and the causation test.
60. Compare Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereof
fromjapan, USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207, at 12-14, 8 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1223, 1228-29 (1985) (final) (injury), with Portland Hydraulic Cement from Columbia, France, Greece, USITC Pub. 1925, Inv. Nos. 731TA-356 to -363, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1663 (1986) (preliminary) (no injury).
61. Compare Internal Combustion Forklift Trucks from Japan, USITC
Pub. 2082, Inv. No. 731-TA-377, at 20-23, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1947, 1954-
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tional bifurcated approach, the Commission will either determine that the domestic industry is experiencing material
injury and then proceed to consider whether the unfair imports are a cause of that injury; or it will determine that the
domestic industry is neither experiencing material injury nor
is threatened with material injury and will terminate its investigation.

2.

The Causation Test

The second prong of the traditional bifurcated approach
is the causation test. The traditional approach to causation
does not include an examination of the effects of the unfair
practice, but instead an examination of the effects of the imports.62 In assessing causation, the Commission includes all
imports from the countries under investigation, except imports of the product from companies for which the Commerce Department has made a negative determination. The
Commission includes all imports from these companies and
not just those imports that the Commerce Department has
55 (1988) (final) (injury), with Certain Bimetalic Cylinders from Japan,
USITC Pub. 2080, lnv. No. 731-TA-383, at 17-19, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
2038, 2044-45 (1988) (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, Comm'rs) (final) (no injury).
62. Four of the six current and eight most recent commissioners have
looked at the effects of all of the unfairly traded imports to assess causation. Compare Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, USITC Pub.
1966, Inv. No. 701-TA-281, at 13-15 (Apr. 1987) (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr,
Comm'rs) (final) (considering effects of imports), with Digital Readout Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Japan, USITC Pub. 2081, Inv. No.
731-TA-390, at 23-25 (May 1988) (Liebeler, Chairman, Brunsdale, V.
Chairman, & Cass, Comm'r) (preliminary) (considering effects of unfair
practice) and Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and
Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 13-14, 8
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1779, 1781 (1986) (Stern, Chairwoman, Liebeler, V.
Chairman, & Brunsdale, Comm'r) (final) (considering effects of unfair
practice). The CIT has recently held that the Commission can, but need
not, consider the size of the unfair practice. Copperweld Corp. v. United
States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 558-64 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Hyundai Pipe Co.
v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 670 F. Supp. 357, 360 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987). Previously, the CIT rejected claims that the Commission
must consider the size of the unfair practice. Maine Potato Council v.
United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (dumped
imports); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640,646 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984) (subsidized imports) (dicta).
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found to be dumped or subsidized. 63 Moreover, those commissioners who use the traditional approach will conclude
that the causation element of the bifurcated test is met if they
find that the imports have contributed to the condition of the
domestic industry. 64 Furthermore, the traditional approach
emphasizes three factors in determining whether the imports
have made any contribution to the condition of the domestic
industry: underselling, lost sales, and import trends.
a.

Underselling

The Commission looks for underselling by comparing
the price of the imported article in the U.S. market with the
price of the like product, which is usually the closest domestic substitute. Underselling occurs when the average price of
the imported article in the U.S. market is below the average
price of the competing domestic article in the U.S. market.65
If the domestic article is more expensive than the imported
article, there is overselling. Underselling is considered to be
evidence of causation; overselling is considered to be evidence against causation. 66
I'

,I
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63. See Memorandum from the General Counsel, U.S. Intemational
Trade Commission, GC-J-016, at 4 (Jan. 27, 1986) (LEXIS, I Trade Library, GCM file).
64. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, USITC Pub. 1844,
Inv. No. 701-TA-257, at 14-15, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2577, 2582-83 (1986)
(final) (three-to-three affirmative on whole fish); see British Steel Corp. v.
United States, 593 F. Supp. 405, 413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
65. Underselling and dumping are different but related concepts. Underselling 'involves a comparison of the price of the imported article to the
price of the like product in the United States. Dumping involves a comparison of the price of the imported article in the United States to the
price of such or similar merchandise at home.
66. Compare Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267, -268 and 731TA-304, -305, at 13,9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1768, 1772-73 (1987) (Brunsdale,
V. Chairman) (final) (causation because in part Korean and Taiwanese
cooking ware undersold domestic cooking ware), with Certain Table Wine
from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy, USITC Pub.
1771, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-258 to -260 and 731-TA-283 to -285, at 18-23, 7
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2645, 2646 (1985) (preliminary) (no. causation because domestic table wine undersold table wine imported from the countries under
investigation). See Perry, supra note 45, at 408 (in almost every case in
which the Commission has made an affirmative determination the imported product has undersold the domestic product).
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Lost Sales

Lost sales are sales that domestic producers have allegedly lost to unfairly traded imports. According to the Commission, a lost sale occurs when a U.S. consumer purchased
the imported product instead of the domestic product because the imported product was cheaper than the domestic
product. 67 To search for lost sales, the Commission asks the
petitioners to provide a list of purchasers from whom they
have allegedly lost sales to unfairly traded imports. The
Commission then has a staff member call these purchasers to
ask them which producers' merchandise they bought. If a
purchaser bought merchandise produced by any of the producers under investigation, the Commission staff member
will ask the purchaser whether the domestic like product was
available when it bought the imported product and the reason for the purchase of the imported product. If the purchaser bought the imported product, acknowledges the
availability of the like product, and lists as one of the reasons
for its purchase of the imported product that it was cheaper
than the like product or says that price was an important consideration in making its purchase decision, the Commission
will consider this a lost sale. The presence of lost sales is
considered to be evidence of causation; their absence is considered to be evidence against causation. 68

c.

Import Trends

The third factor that the Commission traditionally examines is impon trends. When the quantity and market pen67. See Memorandum from the General Counsel, U.S. International
Trade Commission, GC-H-029, at 7 (Jan. 30, 1984), (LEXIS, I Trade Library, GCM file), cited in Jameson, Recent International Trade Commission Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique, 18 L. & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 517, 532 n.63 (1986).
68. Compare Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate from Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 2032, lnv. No. 731-TA-371, at 12, lO I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1470
(final) (negative because, among other reasons, virtually no lost sales allegations were confirmed by the Commission and volume of confirmed lost
sales was quite small), with Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies
Thereoffromjapan, USITC Pub. 1786, lnv. No. 731-TA-207, at 788-89,8
I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1230-31 (final) (affirmative because, among other reasons, there was a significant number of lost sales). See DeGrandis, supra
note 56, at 566-67.
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etration of imports from the countries under investigation
are increasing, the Commission is likely to find a causal connection between the unfairly-traded imports and the condition of the industry. 69 The Commission will also look for a
negative correlation between the market penetration of the
imports and either the market penetration of the domestic
product or the profitability of the domestic industry. The
existence of such a negative correlation is considered evidence of causation, and the absence of a negative correlation
is considered evidence against causation. 7o
III.

THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO INJURY BY REASON OF
DUMPED AND SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS

As will be shown in Section VI, the problem with the
Commission's traditional analysis of causation is that it is
premised on economically unsound assumptions about how
dumped and subsidized imports affect competing domestic
industries. Consequently, to provide a better framework
with which to measure injury, one must understand how an
unfair trade practice affects the competing domestic industry. The first part of this section describes how a subsidy to
an imported product will affect domestic producers of a com-

'i
I

69. Compare Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267, -268 and 731TA-304 & -305, at 11-12, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1772 (final) (causal connection), with Iron Ore Pellets from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1880, Inv. No. 701TA-235, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1115 (1986) (final) (no causal connection). The
Commission also considers the market share held by the unfairly traded
imports. In general, a finding of a causal connection is more likely when
the imports hold a substantial share of the market. Compare Certain Brass
Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, lnv.
Nos. 701-TA-269 and 731-TA-311, -312, -315, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1701
(1986) (final) (causal connection), with Fabric and Expanded Neoprene
Laminate from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2032, Inv. No. 731-TA-371, at 11, 10
I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1473 (1987) (final) (no causal connection).
70. See, e.g., Certain Acetylsalicylic Acid from Turkey, USITC Pub.
1926, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-238 and 731-TA-364 (1986) (preliminary); Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Canada and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1865, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-255 and 731-TA-276, -277, at 10-11, 91.T.R.D. (BNA) 1051,
1054-55 (1986) (final); cases cited in Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil,
USITC Pub. 1818;Inv. Nos. 701-TA-239 and 731-TA-248, at 30 n.l9, 8
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1935, at 1947 n.19 (1986) (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (final); see also DeGrandis, supra note 56, at 566-67.
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peting product and the second part introduces the economic .
approach to injury.

The Effects of a Subsidy on Competing Domestic Producers
The effects of an unfair practice on the competing domestic industry can be illustrated most simply with a subsidy
that shifts the import supply curve by the full amount of the
subsidy. To put the argument in terms of basic supply-anddemand curve analysis, consider a subsidy on Lilliputian widgets. If there are no U.S. widget producers, but some U.S.
firms manufacture gidgets, which are very close substitutes
for widgets, gidgets would be the like product and the U.S.
gidget producers would be the domestic industry. To simplify the discussion, it will be assumed that the U.S. gidget
and Lilliputian widget industries are each made up of many
competing producers and that gidgets and widgets are produced only in the United States and Lilliput but consumed
only in the United States. The law of demand implies that
the U.S. demand for gidgets is a decreasing function of the
price of gidgets. Since widgets are a substitute for gidgets,
the U.S. demand for gidgets is also an increasing function of
the price of widgets. Similarly, the U.S. demand for widgets
is a decreasing function of the price of widgets and an increasing function of the price of gidgets. Equilibrium in the
U.S. gidget and widget markets exists when the prices and
quantities of gidgets and widgets are such that supply and
demand are equal in both markets.
Assume that Lilliput has not subsidized widgets in the
past and that Lilliput has just introduced a subsidy on all
widgets exported to the United States. The subsidy will reduce the cost to Lilliputian widget producers of making widgets for the U.S. market. At any given price for widgets in
the U.S. market, the subsidy will cause an increase in the
number of widgets exported to the United States. At the old
unsubsidized price for widgets in the United States, there
will be an influx of widgets as Lilliputian widget producers
increase production to take advantage of the subsidy. For
importers of widgets to sell their increased stocks, the price
of widgets in the United States will have to fall. Since wid..
gets and gidgets are substitutes, the demand for gidgets will
decline as the price of widgets drops. As a result of the drop
in the demand for gidgets, the price of gidgets will drop and
A.
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the production of gidgets will contract. In addition to falling
prices and production, U.S. gidget producers will experience
increased excess capacity, decreased revenues and reduced
profits. Workers in the gidget industry will also be affected
by the subsidy on Lilliputian widgets, as their hours and
numbers decline. These consequences, which all flow directly from the subsidy, are precisely the kinds of effects that
Congress sought to alleviate when it enacted Title VII.
As the above discussion illustrates, there is a direct effect on a competing domestic industry from a subsidy. A
subsidy shifts out the import supply curve, which in turn
shifts in the demand curve facing the import-competing domestic producers. The net effect of these shifts is to reduce
domestic output, prices, revenue, profits, investment, capacity utilization, and employment in the affected industry. This
effect is illustrated in diagram 1 for the hypothetical subsidy
on Lilliputian widgets. In diagram 1, the subscripts W and G
are used to denote widgets and gidgets and the superscripts
0 and 1 are used to denote the world without and with the
subsidy. D denotes a demand curve, S a supply curve, P a
price, and Qa quantity.
In terms of diagram 1, the initial equilibrium in the U.S.
widget market before the subsidy is available is given by the
intersection of the demand curve Dw0 and the supply curve
Sw0 • This produces an equilibrium price for widgets that are
sold in the United States of Pw0 and an equilibrium output of
<l>v0 • In the gidget market, the initial equilibrium before the
subsidy is available is given by the intersection of the demand curve De0 and the supply curve Se, which yields an
equilibrium price for gidgets of Pe0 and an equilibrium output for gidgets of Q:t Equilibrium in the gidget and widget
markets is determined simultaneously and the interaction
between the two markets is through the demand curves for
gidgets and widgets. Thus, the demand curve De0 is the demand curve for gidgets, assuming that the price of widgets is
Pw 0 , and the demand curve Dw0 is the demand curve for widgets, assuming that the price of gidgets is Pc 0 • Because
gidgets and widgets are substitutes, the demand curve for
gidgets is shifted down and to the left as the price of widgets
declines.
The subsidy to widgets will·shift the widget supply curve
down by the amount of the subsidy that is passed through to
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the supply curve. At the old unsubsidized price for widgets,
the supply of widgets will exceed the demand for widgets, so ·
the price of widgets will fall. The initial demand curve for
widgets and the new supply curve for widgets, when the sub-
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sidy is available, intersect at price Pw' and output Qw'. This
decline in the price of widgets, however, will disturb the
equilibrium in the gidget market because the demand curve
Dc0 only exists when the price of widgets is Pw0 • Because the
price of widgets, Pw', is below Pw0 , the demand curve for
gidgets is shifted in. Because the gidget demand curve and
Sc intersect at a price below PG0 and because the demand
curve Dw0 only exists if the price of gidgets is Pc0 , the demand curve for widgets is also shifted down, which causes a
further shift in the demand for gid~ets. The new equilibrium
exists with the demand curves Dw and Dc1• Thus, the subsidy to widgets affects the gidget market by causing a downward shift in the demand curve for gidgets. Conse~uently,
the subsidy results in a lower price for gidgets, Pc is less
than Pc0 , and a reduction in the output of gidgets, Qp1 is less
than Qp0 •
Diagram 1 can also be used to illustrate the full effect of
the importation of widgets on the market for gidgets. The
full effect ofwidgets on the U.S. market for gidgets is not the
same as the effect of the subsidy to widgets on the U.S. market for gidgets. The full effect of the imports is given by how
much better off the gidget industry would be if no widgets
were sold in the United States. In order to assess the full
effect of the imports, the state of the gidget industry with an
embargo on widgets, superscript 2, must be compared to the
current state of· the industry. The demand curve for gidgets
when there are no widgets for sale, Dc2 , is to the right of the
initial demand curve for gidgets before the subsidy is available. Therefore, the price, Pc2 , and quantity, Qp 2, of gidgets
are higher when widgets are excluded from the U.S. market
than when widgets are sold in the United States but are not
subsidized. Consequently, the reduction in the price and the
quantity of gidgets caused by the importation of subsidized
widgets will exceed the reduction in price and quantity
caused solely by the subsidy to widgets.
B.

The Economic Approach to Injury

The above discussion of how a subsidy affects domestic
producers of a competing product suggests a simple framework for determining whether a domestic industry is materially injured by a subsidy. Compare the condition of the domestic industry today, faced with competing import subsi-
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dies, to the condition that the domestic industry would be in
today if the foreign producers had not been given the subsidy. If the differences in such indicia of the state of the industry as domestic output, prices, revenue, profits, investment, capacity utilization, and employment are substantial,
the import-competing domestic industry has been materially
injured by the subsidy; if these differences are not substantial, the industry has not been so injured. 7 1
Three related aspects of this test differ from the traditional practice of the Commission. 72 First, under the economic approach, the irtiury determination is made using a
counterfactual starting point. The actual condition of the industry is compared with the condition the industry would be
in if the subsidy had not been given to the foreign producers.
Since the second half of the comparison is not directly observable, it can only be estimated. Second, there is no temporal dimension to the test. The comparison is at a point in
time. It is irrelevant whether the industry is doing better or
worse today than it was doing yesterday. 73 Third, the actual
condition of the industry is irrelevant to the determination.
All that matters is how much better the import-competing
domestic industry would have done if the imports were not
subsidized. Thus, under the economic approach, profitable
industries as well as unprofitable industries can be injured by
reason of subsidized imports.
Two additional aspects of this proposed test, although
71. The proposed appoach also applies to the threat-of-material-injury
and material-retardation standards. A domestic industry is threatened
with material injury if the condition of the domestic industry at some future date would be improved materially by preventing the subsidy or
dumping from occurring. The Commission interprets material retardation to mean that an undeveloped domestic industry would otherwise have
developed. Thus, the economic approach to causation would require finding a domestic industry that did not develop would have developed if the
subsidy had not been granted or if the dumping did not occur. The approach also applies to antidumping investigations: compare the current
condition of the industry to the condition the industry would be in but for
the dumping.
72. See supra section II.D.
73. Over a period of time one also could make a comparison in which
the state the industry was in during the period would be compared with
the state the industry would have been in during the same period had the
foreign producer not been given a subsidy. The key is that the same period of time be on both sides of the comparison.
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not as readily apparent, are important to its implementation.
First, in applying the proposed test, the magnitude of the
statutorily recognized injury is important. 74 In general, the
unfair practice will have an adverse impact on the competing
domestic industry. A subsidy that causes a shift in the import
supply curve will have no effect on the competing domestic
industry only when there is an infinitely elastic supply from
third countries of a product that is a perfect substitute for
the subsidized good. Thus, in only one set of conditions will
a subsidy that causes a shift in the import supply curve have
no effect on the prices received or quantities sold by U.S.
producers of competing products. Consequently, if material
becomes synonymous with de minimis, 15 there will be no injury test because in only one ideal case will the unfair practice have no effect at all. 76 In every other instance the unfair
practice has some effect, if only a small one. 77
Second, in making its injury determination under Title
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74. The material injury standard is a low standard. The statute defines
material injury to mean "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial,
or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
75. Congress rejected the term ''de minimis" because of its long and
contentious history under the antidumping law. H. Rep. No. 317, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979).
76. The Court of International Trade has stated that the imports need
contribute only minimally to the condition of the domestic industry. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 405, 413 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984). Such a pronouncement comes close to reading the injury test out
of the law.
77. This argument is perhaps overstated. Any increase in supply from
one foreign country will adversely affect domestic producers unless the
increase in supply is offset exactly by a decrease in supply from other foreign countries, which will only occur in one ideal case. However, not all
dumping and subsidization increases foreign supply. For example, a subsidy to producers to relocate a plant can decrease supply by increasing
transportation costs. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The Meaning of 'Subsidy' and 'Injury' in the Countervailing Duty Law, 6 lNT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 17,
22 ( 1986). Consequently, a de minimis standard for injury could be used
without reading the injury test completely out of the law if the Commission viewed its task to be determining whether the unfair practice has
caused an increase in exports to the United States. Such an analysis, however, would require the Commission to examine only the foreign industry
and would leave it no reason to examine the domestic industry or market,
because any increase in foreign supply would be sufficient to injure the
domestic industry materially. Furthermore, if the Commission treats the
· imports, and not the unfair practice, as the causal factor, the injury test is
read out of the law when a de minimis standard is used, because except for
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VII, it would be impossible for the Commission to compare
every aspect of the condition of the industry as it currently is
with what it would be had the subsidy not been granted. In
addition, for the Commission even to develop both a finely
detailed and highly accurate model of the industry_ and a detailed knowledge of the industry's current conditions would
be very time-consuming and expensive, and it probably
would not significantly improve the application of the approach. Consequently, in making its statutory determination, the Commission should concentrate on both the decline in the price of the like product and the reduction in the
output of the like product brought about by the unfair practice. The proposed approach will be practicable by emphasizing only these two factors. Moreover, the statute directs
the Commission to consider both the reduction in price and
the reduction in output caused by the unfair practice. 78 Most
important, the impact of the subsidy on the other factors that
the statute directs the Commission to consider, such as the
effects on employment, capacity, and profits, will generally
be directly related to the impact of the subsidy on these two
factors. 79 By concentrating on the decline in price and output, the Commission can carry out the intent of Congress in
an efficient and practical manner.

II
IV.

MODEL OF PROPOSED APPROACH TO INJURY
DETERMINATION

The previous section suggested a framework for the
Commission to use to make its injury determination under
one ideal case the domestic industry would always be better if the imports
were excluded from the U.S. market.
78. See 19 U.S.C. § l677(7)(B), (C) (1982). Wood suggests that the
Commission make an affirmative determination only when the unfair trade
practice drives the price of the domestic product below the competitive
price. Wood, "'Unfair' Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach,"
41 Stan. L. Rev. 1153 , 1189 (1989).
79. An unfair trade practice affects the competing domestic through its
impact on the price and output of the like product. Accordingly, if the
negative impact of the unfair practice on other factors is in general
greater, the greater is the impact of the unfair practice on the price and
output of the like product. However, when there is a reason to believe
that the impact of the unfair practice on the other indicia relates differently
to the impact on price and output, the Commission can inquire directly
and more fully into these effects.
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Title VII. Under the proposed approach, an industry is materially injured by reason of subsidized imports if it is materially worse off due to the unfair trade practice. In this section, a mathematical model of the economic approach to injury is developed and is then used to examine the effect of a
subsidy on a competing U.S. industry. Additionally, the
mathematical relations that exist between the parameters of
the model and the injury to the domestic industry from an
unfair practice of a given magnitude are derived. To facilitate the exposition, the example of a su~sidy on Lilliputian
widgets that was used in the previous section is used again.
This section also describes the mathematical model for
the injury caused by a subsidy and how the mathematical relations that are derived from that model can be used. The
formal mathematical model can be used by the Commission
and the public to arrive at rough estimates of the impact of
the subsidy on the price and output of the like product. The
Commission can then use the estimates and economic relations derived from the model to make its statutory determi- ·
nation. 80 The public can also use these estimates and relations to assess the likely outcome of a Commission investigation.
A.

The Mathematical Model

To simplify the development of the mathematical model
·of injury, transportation costs, customs duties, middlemen's
profits, retailers' profits, and other expenses that usually
drive a wedge between the price received by the producer
ctnd the price paid by the consumer for the same product will
be ignored. Consequently, because of the subsidy, Lilliputian widget producers will be paid more by U.S. consumers
and the Lilliputian government together for each widget that
they produce than U.S. consumers alone will pay for each
widget that they buy. Assuming that the Lilliputian government is providing a subsidy of v percent for each widget that
80. See, e.g., Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from Brazil, USITC Pub.
2038, Inv. No. 701-TA-282, at 13-18 (Nov. 1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chair,man) (final); Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 1733, Inv.
No. 701-TA-224, at 13, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2285, 2291 (1985) (final) (estimating decline in live swine prices attributable to increase in Canadian
market share).
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Lilliputian producers export to the United States, which subsidy is fully passed through to the import supply curve, the
ratio of the total price that Lilliputian producers are paid to
the price that U.S. consumers pay for each widget is 1 +v.
Thus, denoting by Pw the price of a widget in the United
States, then Pw(l +v) is the price that Lilliputian producers
are paid for each widget they export to the United States.
The following notation will also be used throughout this
example. Let PG be the price of gidgets in the United States,
Qp the quantity of gidgets sold in the United States, and Q.w
the quantity of widgets sold in the United States. Thus, the
U.S. demand for gidgets can be written as
(1) G(PG,Pw)=Qp.
Denoting the derivatives of the function G with respect to PG
and Pw by G 1 and G 2 , the law of demand implies that G 1 < 0.
In addition, because gidgets and widgets are substitutes,
G 2 >0. Similarly, the U.S. demand for widgets can be written
as
(2) W(PG,Pw)=Q.w,
with W 1 >0 and W2 <0.
The supply side of the U.S. market for widgets and
gidgets is modeled as follows. Assuming that U.S. producers
are willing to sell more gidgets the higher the price of
gidgets, the supply curve for gidgets can be written as
(3) s(PG) =Qc,
with s'>O, where the prime indicates the derivative of the
function. Similarly, the Lilliputian inverse supply curve for
widgets exported to the United States can be written as
(4) t(Pw(1 +v))=Q.w,
with t'>O. Equations (1) through (4) describe the U.S. market for widgets and gidgets with an export subsidy of v percent on widgets. The model is complete in the sense that if
the four functions are specified, the values of the four
unknowns, PG, Pw, Qp and Q.w, can be found. Theoretically,
the injury determination can be made by comparing the
price (Pd and quantity (Qp) of gidgets in the U.S. market,
characterized by equations (1) through (4) with v=O, to the
price and quantity of gidgets in the U.S. market, characterized by equations (1) through (4) with v equal to the actual
subsidy.
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The Injury Measures

To formalize the proposed approach to causation further, I suggest using two measures of injury: the relative decline in the price of the domestic like product caused by the
subsidy (I) and the relative decline in the output of the domestic like product caused by the subsidy (J). As applied
here, these two measures are the relative declines in the
price and quantity of gidgets sold in the U.S. market that are
caused by the subsidy to widgets. Using the notation that the
superscripts 0 and 1 denote the world without and with the
subsidy, the two measures are written as follows:
Pc0
(5)

-

Pc 1

I=
pGO

and

Qvo- Qv'

(6)

]=

Qvo

Because the subsidy reduces both the price and the output of
gidgets, the measures I and] are both between zero and one.
In addition, the higher the values of I and J, the larger the
declines in the price and output of gidgets caused by the subsidy to widgets. Thus, with all other things being equal, the
higher the values of I and J, the larger is the injury from the
subsidy and the more likely it is that the subsidy has materially injured the domestic industry.

2. Constant Elasticity Demand and Supply Curves
In order to derive explicit mathematical formulae for the.
injury measures, some limitations are placed on the demand
and supply curves. Gidge~s and widgets are assumed to be
imperfect substitutes and to have the following industrywide, constant-elasticity demand equations:
(7)
Qv = APc -apwb
'I

I

'.

and
(8)
Qw = BPccPw -d.
The constants A, B, a, b, c, and d are all positive. The first
two constants (A, B) are scale parameters. The last four con-
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stants are the own-price elasticity of demand for gidgets (a),
the cross elasticity of demand for gidgets with respect to the
price of widgets (b), the cross elasticity of demand for widgets with respect to the price of gidgets (c), and the ownprice elasticity of demand for widgets (d). The supply equations for gidgets and widgets, assumed to be of constant
elasticity and upward sloping, can be written as:
(9)

~

=

CPce

and

Qw = DPwr(l +v)r.
The constants C, D, e and f are all positive. The first two
constants (C, D) are scale parameters. The last two constants are the elasticity of supply of gidgets (e) and the elasticity of excess supply of widgets to the U.S. market (f).
Assuming that the U.S. gidget-widget market is characterized by equations (7) through (10), the two measures of
the injury caused by the subsidy, I and J, can be written as
follows: 81
(11)
I - 1-(1+v)z
(10)

., I
II: II
'I•

I''

'I~~
i

and
(12)
where

J -

(13)

Z=

I

1- (1 +v)ez,
-bf

(a + e)(d + f)-be.
The two cross-elasticities of demand, b and c, are not independent of one another. Denoting by mw the share by
value of the total gidget-widget market held by widgets, the
share held by gidgets is 1- mw. Denoting the quotient of the
widget market share and the gidget market share by M, so
81. This result is based on a result derived by D. Rousslang & J.
Suomela, Calculating the Consumer and Net Welfare Costs oflmport Relief 74-76 (1985) (Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission, Staff Research Study Number 15) (available in the author's file at the
offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York University
School of Law). The following comparative-statics exercise is similar to
the one given in Memorandum from the Director, Office of Economics,
U.S. International Trade Commission, EC-J-010, at 29-31 (Jan. 7, 1986)
(available in the author's file at the offices of the journal of International Law
and Politics, New York University School of Law) (using producer surplus).
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that M - mw/0-mw), the relation between the two crosselasticities is given by c=Mb. Substituting Mb for c in equation (13) yields:
(14)

'!

z=

-fb

(a + e)(d + f)-Mb 2
Equations (11), (12), and (14) describe the effect of a subsidy
to widgets on the price and output of gidgets as a function of
the size of the subsidy, the market share of gidgets, and the
various elasticities of demand and supply.
One way for the Commission to make its injury determination is to use equations (11), (12), and (14) to calculate the
percentage decreases in the price and output of gidgets from
a given subsidy to widgets. By using estimated values for the
parameters in equations {11), (12), and (14), the Commission can estimate the percentage declines in the price and
output of the like product. Of course, for the Commission to
calculate the precise amount of injury, it will have to be able
to measure these parameters precisely. 82 In order for the
Commission to base its determination on a mathematical calculation, however, it will not be necessary for the Commission to measure the amount of injury precisely.s3 It will be
sufficient if the Commission using reasonable estimates for
the parameters, can conclude that the impact of the unfair
practice is either likely or unlikely to be substantial enough
to constitute material injury. Even though the economic approach to causation is not entirely precise, its use could improve the accuracy and predictability of the Commission's
determinations. This is in accord with congressional intent,
and it would benefit the parties, their lawyers, and consumers, who would all be better served by a more transparent
and predictable process than the current one.s4

(
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J
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82. In addition, the Commission will need a more fully developed and
complete mathematical model to measure precisely the impact. That the
precise impact of the subsidy can be calculated, at least in theory, with the
approach I suggest, but not with the approach traditionally used by the
Commission, underscores the poor economic foundation upon which the
Commission traditionally bases its analysis of causation.
83. Moreover, Title VII does not require such a precise calculation,
although it is not prohibited either. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 47 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1979
U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 444.
84. According to the Ways and Means Committee Report, one of the
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In order for the Commission to estimate the impact of
the unfair practice, it will often be sufficient if the Commission can limit the ranges of the various elasticities. This sort
of qualitative information is likely to be readily available to
the Commission. For example, properly gathered consumer
responses and pricing data should permit the Commission to
conclude whether the imported article and the like product
are good or poor substitutes for one another. In addition,
the elasticities of demand for the imported product and the
like product will be large when there are numerous suppliers
of competing products. When there are few substitutes
available, the demands will be inelastic. Similarly, the elasticities of supply will be large when there is significant idle
capacity, when capacity can be easily expanded (such as by
converting existing plant and equipment), and when output
can easily be diverted between markets. This is the sort of
information that the Commission should be able to obtain
through its study of the industry. Of course, the dumping
and subsidy margins are reported to the Commission by the
the Commerce Department and the Commission compiles
market share data in almost every case.
Even if precise estimates of the impact of the subsidy on
the price and output of the like product could be made, the
economic approach to causation would still not be exact.
There are two reasons for this. First, there is no single measure of injury but instead two measures. These two measures are the decline in price and the decline in output of the
like product. Of course, a single measure that is some explicit function of these two measures could be used; but no
such measure is proposed in this paper. 85 Second, there is
accomplishments of the 1979 GAIT negotiations was to provide for
greater transparency in the administration of national antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1979). Nonetheless, several lawyers who practice before the Commission
have criticized the Commission for inadequately explaining the reasoning
behind its determinations. See E. Easton, supra note 56, at 28-31; G. Horlick & S. Landers, The Court of International Trade's Standard for Review
of the International Trade Commission's Injury Determinations 6-7 (Sept.
15, 1986) (presented at the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S.
Court of International Trade, Oct. 24, 1986) (available in the author's file
at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York University School of Law).
85. I have considered using producer revenue and the economic con-
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no precise definition of material. Even if there were a single
measure of injury, it would still be up to each commissioner
to determine how much injury is material. Although there
can be an arbitrary definition of materiality, there is no theoretical reason for choosing one definition over another.
Thus, a commissioner using the economic approach will still
have substantial leeway even after the impact of the subsidy
on the price and output of the like product is calculated
when he makes a determination. However, over time a commissioner's leeway will contract as the commissioner issues
more determinations and thus implicitly defines the relation
between the two measures of injury and the standard for materiality.

1
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B.

Factors Affecting the Injury from an Unfair Practice

Another reason for using a mathematical model is that
the model can be used to derive economic relations between
the parameters of the model and the injury to the domestic
industry from the unfair trade practice. These relations can
be used by the Commission and the general public to improve their understanding of how the proposed approach is
applied. By understanding how various market conditions,
such as market share, elasticity of demand, and elasticity of
supply, relate to the injury to the domestic industry from a
given subsidy, the public could more accurately assess what
the Commission's final determination will be using the economic approach and thereby improve the predictability of
the Commission's determinations.s6
The relation between any parameter of the model (a, b,
d, e, f, M, or v) and the injury to the domestic gidget industry
from a subsidy to Lilliputian widgets can be found by differentiating equations ( 11) and ( 12), after substituting for Z
from equation (14), with respect to the parameter. The relationship between each factor and the injury to the domestic
industry is described below.
cept of producer surplus but have not yet been able to conclude that the
use of either as the sole measure of injury would be appropriate.
86. Memorandum from the Director, supra note 81, at 29-31, gives a
discussion of some of these economic relations.
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The Unfair Trade Margin

Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the injury to domestic gidget producers from a given subsidy on widgets is related to the size of the subsidy itself. The effect on gidget
producers of increasing the subsidy on widgets is found by
substituting for Z in equations (ll) and (12) from equation
(14) and differentiating the resulting equations with respect
to v. 87 As intuition suggests, increasing the subsidy will
cause a decline in the price and quantity of gidgets sold in
the U.S. market. Thus, the larger the subsidy received by
widget producers, the greater the injury to the domestic
gidget industry, and the more likely is it that the domestic
gidget industry has been materially injured as a result of the
subsidy to widgets.

2. Own-Price Elasticity of Demand for Gidgets
Another factor that is related to the magnitude of the
injury caused by the subsidy is the own-price elasticity of demand for gidgets. The more elastic the demand for gidgets,
the smaller the relative declines in the price and quantity of
gidgets from a given subsidy to widgets. 88 Conversely, the
less elastic the U.S. demand for gidgets, the greater the relative declines in price and quantity from the export subsidy to
widgets. Therefore, the less elastic the U.S. demand for
87. The derivatives are as follows:
dl
dv
and

=

-Z(l+v)Z-1>0

~

= -eZ(l +v)~z-l >Odv
To say that the derivatives of I andJ with respect to v are positive means
that the relative declines in price and quantity from the subsidy are greater
the larger the subsidy is.
88_ The derivatives are as follows:
dl
-ln(l +v)k(l +v)Zfb(d+f) <0
da
and
~

da

= -ln(l+v)k(l+v)ezefb(d+£)<0,

where k

= [(a+e)(d+f)-Mb 2)- 2 •

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

72

[Vol. 22:37

gidgets, the greater the injury from a given subsidy to widgets.
3.

Own-Price Elasticity of Demand for Widgets

There is a similar relation between the own-price elasticity of demand for widgets and the injury to the domestic
gidget industry from a subsidy on widgets. The less elastic
the U.S. demand for widgets, the greater the injury to the
domestic gidget industry from a given subsidy on widgets. 89
The economic intuition behind this result is that if demand
for widgets is relatively elastic, the subsidy, which increases
the supply of widgets, will generally increase U.S. consumption of widgets without causing U.S. widget prices to decline
substantially. Consequently, if the subsidy does not cause
widget prices to decline by very much, the prices and sales of
domestic gidget producers will not decline by very much
either.

Substitutability of Gidgets and Widgets
The fourth factor that affects the magnitude of the injury experienced by the gidget industry as a result of the subsidy is the substitutability of gidgets and widgets. The
higher the degree of substitution between gidgets and widgets, the larger are both the decrease in the price of gidgets
and the decrease in the output of gidgets from a given subsidy on widgets. 90 The economic intuition behind this result
is that the higher the degree of substitution between widgets
4.

89. The derivatives are as follows:

:~ =

-ln(l+v)k(l+v)zfb(a+e)<O

and

fct =

-ln(l+v)k(l+v)eZefb(a+e)<O.

90. The only measure of the substitutability of widgets and gidgets in
equations (12), (13), and (14) is the elasticity of demand for gidgets with
respect to the price of widgets, b. Given the market share of gidgets, however, the cross-elasticities (the elasticity of demand for gidgets with respect
to the price of widgets and the elasticity of demand for widgets with respect to the price of gidgets) are positive multiples of one another; thus,
the larger b is, the larger c is. In addition, the larger b and c are, the
greater is the elasticity of substitution between gidgets and widgets. The
derivatives of I and J with respect to b are as follows:
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and gidgets, the greater will be the diversion of sales from
gidgets to widgets as a result of the subsidy, and the greater
will be the pressure on domestic producers to lower prices in
order to reduce this diversion brought about by the decrease
in the price of widgets.9 1
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Market Share of Widgets

The market share of widgets is also related to the magnitude of the injury caused by the subsidy. The larger the market share of widgets, the greater the injury to the domestic
gidget industry. 92 The economic intuition behind this result
is as follows. Since the elasticity of supply of widgets to the
U.S. market is assumed constant, then for any given price for
widgets, the percentage increase in widget exports caused by
the subsidy will be independent of the market share held by
widgets. However, although the percentage increase in widget sales is independent of market share, the absolute increase in widget sales as a result of the subsidy is greater the
larger the share of the market held by widgets before the
subsidy is given. Thus, the larger the market share of widgets, the greater the increase in widgets sold from a given
subsidy; and the greater the increase in widgets from the

~~

= ln(l +v)k(l +v)z[(a+e)(d+f)+Mb2]f>0

and

it,

= ln(l +v)k(l +vtZ[(a+e)(d+f)+Mb2]ef>0.

91. This result is the opposite of the result in antitrust analysis, in
which injury is more likely the more differentiated the goods are. SeeR.
PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw 125-34 (1976). The reason for this difference is
that antitrust law is concerned with injury to consumers from raising
prices, whereas the antidumping and countervailing duty law is concerned
with injury to competing domestic producers from reducing prices. Producers raise their prices more easily when their merchandise is differentiated in the eyes of consumers, whereas they maintain their prices with
more difficulty when competing producers lower their prices and their
merchandise is not differentiated in the eyes of consumers.
92. The derivatives are as follows:

:~

3

=

ln(l+v)k(l+v)zfb >0

=

ln(l+v)k(l+vtzefb3 >0.

and
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subsidy, the greater the injury to the competing domestic industry._
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6.

Supply Elasticities

The supply elasticities are also related to the size of the
injury to the domestic industry from the subsidy. The more
elastic the supply of widgets to the United States, the greater
the injury to the domestic industry producing gidgets from a
given subsidy to widgets. 93 The economic intuition behind
this result is that the subsidy will increase imports by a larger
amount the more elastic is the supply of imports to the
United States. For gidgets, the relationship between the
elasticity of supply of gidgets and the injury to the industry
producing gidgets is ambiguous. The relative decline in the
price of gidgets is larger the less elastic is the supply of
gidgets, whereas the relative decline in the quantity of
gidgets is larger the more elastic is the supply of gidgets. 94
The intuition here is that the subsidy shifts the demand
curve for gidgets and the more elastic the supply of gidgets
the more this shift is translated into a reduction in output
and the less it is translated into a reduction in price, and conversely.

7.

The Role of the Factors in Inferring Injury

The discussion in the last few paragraphs does not apply
only to hypothetical widgets and gidgets, nor are the relations likely to change if a more general model were used.
The injury to any domestic industry from a subsidy to a competing imported product will depend on the size of the sub93. The derivatives are as follows:
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sidy, the elasticity of demand for the like product, the elasticity of demand for the imported product, the elasticity of substitution between the like product and the imported product,
the market shares of the two products, and the elasticities of
supply of the two products to the U.S. market. In general,
the injury to the domestic industry will be greater the larger
the subsidy, the less elastic the demands for the like product
and the imported product, the more substitutable the two
products are, the larger the market share held by the imported product, and the more elastic the supply of the imported product.
The above discussion suggests a second method that the
Commission can use to make its statutory determination.
The Commission can make its determination by looking at
the above factors, noting the size of the subsidy and the import penetration ratio, assessing the magnitudes for the various elasticities, and making ajudgment as to whether the impact of the subsidy is large enough for it to have materially
injured the domestic industry. 95 These factors can also be
used by the Commission to check its conclusions if it chooses
to make mathematical estimates of the relative declines and
by the parties to understand how strong or how weak a particular case is before the Commission makes its determination.96
Finally, it must be emphasized that the Commission
should use these factors to assist it in making a reasoned
judgment about the impact of the subsidy on the price and
quantity of the like product. These factors are not substitutes for the statutory factors. The statutory factors, which
are mostly various effects that the unfair practice has had, are
rarely directly observable. In most investigations, it will not
be possible for the Commission to observe directly the de95. The same analysis with some modifications could be used if imports
were the statutory cause. The only changes are that if imports are the
statutory cause, the two factors that relate the effect of the unfair practice
to the level of imports, the unfair trade margin and the elasticity of supply
of imports to the United States, would not be used.
96. It should be emphasized that the two methods of implementing the.
economic approach, the mathematical equation and the factors, are not
different approaches but different ways of implementing the same approach. Moreover, the factors were derived from the equations, such that
the two methods are consistent.
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clines in price, output, and employment that domestic producers suffer because of a subsidy. 97 In those cases where
the impact of the subsidy cannot be observed directly, the
factors discussed in this section can be used to indirectly assess the effects that the statute requires the Commission to
consider when it makes its determination. Thus, the economic approach to causation would not supplant the statute;
rather, its use permits the Commission to fulfill its statutory
obligation.
V.

JusTIFICATION OF THE EcoNOMIC APPROACH TO INJURY

This section makes three broad arguments on the
proper interpretation of Title VII: (1) that a single determination of injury and causation should be made; (2) that the
causal factor is the unfair trade practice, and not the imports
that benefit from the unfair trade practice; and (3) that the
causal factor must materially injure the competing domestic
industry. In order for the Commission to use the economic
approach to injury suggested in this Article, these three interpretations must be reasonable interpretations of the law.
As is shown below, there is authority for all three interpretations.
A.

Material Injury-Unitary v. Bifurcated Approaches

Title VII directs the Commission to determine whether
the domestic industry has been materially injured by reason
of the unfairly traded imports. In making its determination,
the Commission is to consider, in addition to any other factors it considers relevant, the quantity of the imports, the effect of the imports on prices, and the impact of the imports
on the domestic industry. 98 It is this last direction, to consider the impact on the domestic industry, that is usually
cited by the Commission to justify its practice of bifurcating
the injury and causation tests. 99 Furthermore, the Commis97. It will be just as impossible for the Commission to observe directly
the effects of the imports.
98. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, USITC Pub.
1966, Inv. No. 701-TA-281, at 10 n.28 (Apr.l987) (final); Certain Fresh
Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel,
Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Peru, USITC Pub. 1877, Inv. Nos.
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sion's bifurcated approach to material injury and its· weak
causation standard, which requiref that the imports only
contribute to the condition of the industry, are related.
The Commission has justified its use of a weak causation
standard by the legislative directive that the imports be a
cause of material injury, and not the cause. 100 Several commissioners have argued, and the Court of International
Trade (CIT) has held, that by not requiring the imports to be
the cause of material injury, Congress intended for the Commission to make an affirmative determination whenever the
imports contribute to the state of the industry.l 01 The proponents of this position read the phrase "material injury" to
modify the state of the domestic industry, not the effect of
the unfair practice on the domestic industry, leaving no additional statutory guidance to describe the impact of the unfair
practice. Thus, the CIT has reasoned that because material
injury describes the state of the industry and the legislative
history instructs the Commission not to compare the impact
of the unfair imports with the impact of other causes, only
the slightest impact by the imports is required to satisfy the
causation requirement.1o2
·
This interpretation, however, misconstrues the statutory
language al}d the legislative history. Nowhere does the statute contain an injury test separate and apart from the causation test. Although the statute instructs the Commission to
consider the impact of the unfair imports on the domestic
industry, this does not mean that the Commission should inquire into the state of the industry independently of the effect of the imports. The statute only requires that the Commission determine whether the domestic industry has been
i

303-TA-17, -18, 701-TA-275 to -278, and 731-TA-327 to -334, at 9 (July
1986) (preliminary).
100. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1979); S. REP.
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AoMIN. NEws 381, 443 (the issue is not whether subsidized or less-thanfair-value "imports are the principal, a substantial, or a significant cause of
material injury").
101. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 405,413 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, USITC
Pub. No. 701-TA-257, at 14-15, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2582-83 (1986)
(Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, Comm'rs) (final) (three-to-three affirmative on
whole fish).
102. See British Steel, 593 F. Supp. at 413.
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materially injured by reason of certain imports and that the
Commission. in making this determination, should examine
factors that indicate the health of the industry. Instructing
the Commission to examine factors that relate to the health
of the domestic industry does not mean that these factors
should be looked at in a vacuum independently of the effect
of the unfair trade practice. nor does it mean the Commission should make a determination whether or not the industry is healthy. Furthermore, requiring that the imports be a
cause of material injury only implies that there can be other
causes ofmaterial injury. When Congress directed the Commission not to weigh the injury from the imports against the
impact of any other causes, 103 Congress was simply telling
the Commission to determine whether the imports have
caused material injury. It stretches both the statutory language and the legislative history to read the congressional
directive that the Commission should not weigh causes to
imply that the Commission should use a separate injury test
and require only a small contributing effect.I 04
Conceptually, a bifurcated approach makes no sense.
Whether the domestic industry is doing well or not is not the
issue; the issue is whether the domestic industry would be
doing better but for the unfair practice. 105 A growing, highly
profitable industry can be adversely affected by unfair imports as can a declining, unprofitable industry. 10 6
103. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1979); S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 74, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 381, 460.
104. It is especially troublesome for the Commission to rely on legislative history that instructs it not to weigh causes to justify an approach in
which the outcome of any investigation largely depends on other causes.
105. See Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 649
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (purpose of Commission investigation is not to determine whether the domestic industry is healthy but to determine what
effect the imports have had on the domestic industry), vacated by American
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986); but see American
Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984) (the industry must be in a state of injury and the imports
must be a cause of that injury), aff'd sub nom. Armco Inc. v. United States,
760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
106. There could be a policy reason for granting relief more easily to
declining industries than to growing industries. Harm by unfair imports
to a declining industry exacerbates the decline and produces more idle
capital and more unemployed workers. If one assumes that adjustment

-------

~----

1989]

AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

79

There is one more point to make about the bifurcated
approach traditionally used by the Commission. Because an
absolute standard for injury is coupled with a weak causation
test, the Commission's determination might depend primarily on the state of the industry. The state of the industry,
however, can depend on a multitude of factors that are unrelated to the unfair imports, such as exchange rate fluctuations or where the economy is in the current business cycle.to7
. An examination of the case law does not require a different conclusion. American Spring Wire Corp.'v. United States 108 is
frequently cited as the leading case supporting the bifurcated
approach. 109 In American Spring Wire, the CIT, in upholding a
negative injury determination by the Commission, held that
the Commission must find both injury and causation. The
CIT reasoned that the statute requires both that the injury
be material and that it be by reason of the imports. In other
words, the Commission cannot make an affirmative determination unless there is both injury and causation. Therefore,
the CIT concluded that it was proper for the Commission to
base its negative determination on the absence of material
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costs are lower for firms that are expanding than for firms that are contracting, then, other things being equal, the harm to a declining industry
from unfair imports in general will exceed the harm to a growing industry.
This effect, however, can be taken into account when measuring the impact of the practice without bifurcating the determination.
There could be a political reason for granting relief only to declining
industries. Congress may desire to protect workers and investors in declining industries but not workers and investors in growing industries, because their suffering, though not their injury from unfair trade practices,
can be observed in declining industries, but neither their suffering nor
their injury from unfair trade practices can be observed in growing industries. Such an approach to protecting domestic industries may be politically expedient, but the antidumping and countervailing duty laws would
be a poor means of implementing such a policy, because the relief is unrelated to the suffering. However, there is no indication that this approach
is what Congress intended when it passed the I 979 Act.
107. This problem is exacerbated by allowing the petitioner to choose
when to file its petition. See E. Easton, supra note 56, at 19.
108. 590 F. Supp. 1273 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd sub nom. Armco Inc.
v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
109. E.g., Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereoffrom
Japan, USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207, at 20-21, 8 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) at 1231-32 (1 985) (Eckes, Comm'r) (final).
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injury using a bifurcated approach.IIO
The CIT's reasoning is not persuasive. It makes no
sense to read the statutory language "material injury ... by
reason of" to permit a bifurcated approach, because it would
not be sufficient if the "by reason of" standard was met but
the "material injury" standard was not.
Moreover, even by its own terms, the CIT's opinion in
American Spring Wire does not preclude a unitary approach.
Certainly, there must be both injury and causation, and both
the unitary and bifurcated approaches require injury and
causation. The difference is that the unitary approach views
"material injury ... by reason of" as both effect and cause,
whereas the bifurcated approach views "by reason of" as
both effect and cause and material injury as a separate inquiry. Thus, with the unitary approach it is impossible to
have injury without causation, or vice versa, but with the bifurcated approach it is possible to have only injury or causation. Consequently, the CIT's opinion upholding a determination that the CIT admits was not explicitly bifurcated 111
should not be read to preclude a unitary approach on the
grounds that the statute requires both injury and causation.
B.

The Statutory Cause-The Unfair Practice v. The Imports

The statute requires that the domestic industry be materially injured "by reason of" dumped and subsidized imports. The commissioners who adhere to the traditional approach interpret this language to mean that the Commission
should determine whether the imports, and not the unfair
practice, have caused material injury to the domestic industry.112 The advocates of this position argue that the above
I

I I

110. American Spring Wire, 590 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
111. Id. at 1277.
112. See, e.g., Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, supra note
62, at 13-15 (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr, Comm'rs); Certain Fresh Atlantic
Groundfish from Canada, USITC Pub. 1844, Inv. No. 701-TA-257, at 1317, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2582-85 (1986) (Eckes, Lodwick & Rohr,
Comm'rs) (final). See also Perry, supra note 45, at 415-23 (review of commissioners' opinions in the debate on margins). Whether the Commission
should consider the size of the unfair trade practice is examined in an excellent debate. Compare Easton & Perry, The Causation of Material Injury:
Changes in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of the International Trade Commission, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 35 (1983) (Commission
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statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and thus, resort to the legislative history is inappropriate; II!J however,
their arguments are unsound.

1. Statutory Language
The statute requires that the Commission determine
whether the domestic industry is materially injured "by reason of imports of the merchandise with respect to which [the
Commerce Department] has made an affirmative determination." Both the term "imports" and the phrase "by reason
of" are ambiguous. For example, the term "imports" could
refer to any of three classes of imports: (I) the additional
imports that result from the dumping or subsidization; (2)
the imports that the Commerce Department has found to be
dumped or subsidized; or (3) the imports over which the
Commerce Department calculates the weighted-average
margin of dumping or subsidization, including those that
were neither dumped nor subsidized. 11 4
The phrase "by reason of" is also ambiguous, as it
could refer to either the full effect of the imports or the effect
should consider effect of imports), with Palmeter, Countervailing Subsidized
Imports: The International Trade Commission Goes Astray, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN
LJ. 1 (1983) (Commission should consider effect of unfair practice).
113. Certain Welded Pipes and Tubes from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1519, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-131, -132, -138, at 11, 6
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1891, 1896-1900 (1984) (final); Certain Carbon Steel
Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331, lnv. Nos. 701-TA-155, -157 to160, -162, at 14, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2030, 2035 (1983) (final); Certain Steel
Wire Nails from Korea, USITC Pub. 1223, Inv. No. 701-TA-145, at 15, 3
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1931, 1937-38 (1982) (Calhoun, V. Chairman) (preliminary).
As a matter of statutory interpretation, a statute dear and unambiguous on its face must be interpreted according to its facial meaning without
resorting to the statute's legislative history. A statute that is not clear and
unambiguous should only be interpreted after considering its legislative
history. 2 A. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 45.02 (4th
ed. 1972).
114. It is interesting that some of the Commissioners who have argued
that the phrase "by reason of" is dear and unambiguous have adopted the
broadest and perhaps least obvious definition of imports. See, e.g., HeavyWalled Rectangular Welded Pipes and Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub.
1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 27-28, 81.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1786-88 (Eckes,
Comm'r, dissenting) (final) (Commission should consider neither the
dumping margin nor the portion of imports found to be dumped).
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of the imports through the dumping or subsidization. To
see why the injury caused by the unfair practice is "by reason
of" the imports, assume that the Lilliputian widget subsidy
applies only to widgets from one region of Lilliput, so that
only a portion of the widgets sold in the United States will
benefit from the subsidy. However, because all widgets are
identical, all will sell for a lower price in the United States as
a result of the subsidy to some of them. Thus, a subsidy to
some widgets affects U.S. gidget producers through all widgets, subsidized and unsubsidized. More generally, the effects of dumping and subsidization on the domestic industry
are transmitted through both fairly and unfairly traded imports. Thus, when the unfair practice is the statutory cause,
the injury is still "by reason of" the imports.
In addition, the language of the statute suggests that the
causal factor is the unfair practice. Congress has provided
the Commission with the following direction for making its
determination of threat of material injury in countervailing
duty investigations:
Nature of subsidy. In determining whether
there is a threat of material injury, the Commission
shall consider such information as may be
presented to it by [the Commerce Department] as
to the nature of the subsidy (particularly as to
whether the subsidy is an export subsidy inconsistent with the Agreement) provided by a foreign
country and the effects likely to be caused by the
subsidy . 115
In a Title VII case, if the causal factor is not the unfair practice, it is not clear why the likely effects of the subsidy would
be relevant for a determination in a countervailng duty case.
In addition, if Congress wanted the Commission to
make its causation determination by assessing how much
better off the domestic industry would be if all the imports
under investigation were excluded from the U.S. market,
Congress could have clearly told the Commission to do so.
The statute, however, does hot direct the Commission to ascertain whether the condition of the domestic industry would
be materially improved if all the merchandise of the class or
ll!>. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(i) (1982).

----·--......__
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kind that the Commerce Department has found to be unfairly traded were excluded from the U.S. market. Such a
formulation would be unambiguous and would require the
Commission to use an all-imports standard. Yet this is not
how Congress drafted the statute, and it is inappropriate for
the Commission to interpret it in this way based on the language of only one portion of the statute and without considering the legislative history.

2.

Legislative History

The legislative history provides some guidance for what
Congress meant by the phrase "by reason of imports of the
merchandise with respect to which (the Commerce Department] has made an affirmative determination." On several
occasions Congress instructed the Commission to examine
the effect of the dumping or subsidy on the domestic industry. The Senate Report specifically directed the Commission
to consider the effect of the dumping or subsidy:
[F]or one type of product, price may be the key factor in making a decision as to which product to
purchase and a small price differential resulting
from the amount of the subsidy or the margin of
dumping can be decisive; for others, the size of the
differential may be of lesser significance. 11 6
Moreover, in 1979, President Carter submitted a trade bill to
Congress accompanied by Statements of Administrative Action describing how the proposed legislation was to be ad116. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979). The House Re~
port contains nearly identical language. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong.,
lst Sess. 46, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 381,474.
The following are additional examples of Congress' direction to the
Commission to consider the effect of the unfair trade practice: "Section
705 [19 U.S.C. § 1671d] provides for final determinations on investiga~
tions by [Commerce] and the [Commission] on the question of whether or
not imported merchandise is receiving a subsidy which is causing material
injury to a domestic industry." H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
55 (1979). The Commission "considers, among other factors, ... how the
effects of the net bounty or grant relate to the injury, if any, to the domes~
tic industry." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1979
U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 381,443. "[T]he Commission must sat~
isfy itself that, in light of all the information presented, there is a sufficient
causal link between the subsidization and the requisite injury." /d. at 58.
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ministered. With respect to material injury, the Statements
declared:
It is expected that in its investigation the Commission will continue to focus on the conditions of
trade and development within the industry concerned. For one industry, an apparently small volume of imports may have a significant impact on the
market; for another the same volume might not be
significant. Similarly, for one type of product, price
may be the key factor in determining sales elasticity,
and a small price differential resulting from the
amount of the subsidy or the margin of dumping
can be decisive; in others the size of the margin may
be of lesser significance.
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The petitioner must demonstrate, and the
Commission must satisfy itself that, in light of all
the information presented, there is the requisite
causal link between the subsidization or dumping
and material injury .111
Congress approved these Statements as submitted to it by
the President as part of the 1979 Act. 118 Thus, the language
of the Statements and the legislative history of the 1979 Act
strongly support the unfair practice interpretation.
It must be conceded that the legislative history speaks of
the effects of the dumped or subsidized imports with about
the same frequency that it speaks of the effects of the dumping or subsidization. For example, the House Report states:
"In determining whether such injury is 'by reason of' such
imports, the [Commission] looks at the effects of such imports on the domestic industry." 119 However, it would be
inappropriate to conclude that the legislative history is con-

i'

117. STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 434-35, reprinted in 1979 U.S. ConE CoNe. &
ADMIN. NEWS 665, 669-70.
118. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1982).
119. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1979). The Senate
Report contains similar language. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1979 U.S. ConE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 461
("the Commission must satisfy itself that, in light of all the information
presented, there is a sufficient causal link between the less-than-fair-value
imports and the requisite injury").
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tradictory and provides no indication of Congressional intent. The apparent shifting back and forth between the effects of the imports and the effects of the unfair practice suggests that Congress intended for the Commission to assess
the effects of the imports through the unfair practice and
that the phrase "by reason of the imports" means the effect
of the imports through the unfair practice.
3.

The GATT

Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 in
order to bring U.S. law into conformity with the international obligations of the United States. 120 The language of
the GATT agreements provides further support for the use
of an unfair-practice standard. In addition, by adopting an
all-import standard over an unfair-practice standard, the
Commission has unnecessarily put the United States in violation of the GATT, since the GATT requires that the unfair
practice be the cause of material injury before an antidumping or countervailing duty can be imposed. Article VI of the
GATT, which covers antidumping and countervailing duties,
contains the following language:
No contracting party shall levy an antidumping or
countervailing duty on the importations of any
product of the territory of another contracting party
unless it determines that the effect of the dumping
or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to
cause or threaten material injury to an established
domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially
the establishment of a domestic industry. 1 2 1
Thus, the Commission's practice is contrary to Article VI of
the GATT.
The Codes support this interpretation of Title VII. The
Codes contain language about the effects of the imports
from which the language of Title VII was derived. For example, Article 6 of the Subsidies Code contains the following
directions for making injury determinations:
1. A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of the General Agreement shall involve an
120. 19 u.s.c. § 2503 (1982).
121. GATT, supra note 12, art. VI, § 5.
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objective examination of both (a) the volume of
subsidized imports and their effect on prices in the
domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.
2. With regard to volume of subsidized imports
the investigating authorities shall consider whether
there has been a significant increase in subsidized
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing signatory.
With regard to the effect of the subsidized imports
on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the subsidized imports as compared
with the price of a like product of the importing signatory, or whether the effect of such imports is
otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree
or prevent price increases, which otherwise would
have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or
several of these factors can necessarily give decisive
guidance.
3. The examination of the impact on the domestic
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all
relevant economic factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of the industry such as actual
and potential decline in output, sales, market share,
profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices;
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow,
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to
raise capital or investment and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased burden on Government support pro-grammes. This list
is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these
122
factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
The Subsidy Code then goes on to explain what is meant by
the phrase "the impact of these imports" by requiring that
122. Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. VI, paras. 1-3 (footnotes omitted). See also Antidumping Code, supra note 14, art. III, paras. 1-3 (containing almost identical language).
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the impact of the imports be through the effects of the unfair
practice:
4. It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects 19 of the subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of this [Code]. There
may be other factors which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries
caused by other factors must not be attributed to
the subsidized imports.
19. As set forth in paras. 2 and 3 of this Article. 123

The argument that the Subsidies Code does not require
that the subsidy cause injury to the domestic industry rests
on footnote 19 in paragraph 4. According to the proponents
of this view, injury does not have to be caused by the subsidy
because the effects of the subsidy are assessed by the impact
of the imports. 124 There are several problems with this interpretation of the Subsidies Code. First, this interpretation
reads the phrase "through the effects of the subsidy" out of
the Subsidies Code entirely. Second, footnote 19 only refers
to certain factors to be considered in assessing the effects of
the subsidy. These factors-increased imports, price undercutting by the imports, and price suppression-can all be
traced to the subsidy. As discussed previously, the effects of
the subsidy are transmitted to the domestic industry by
means of the price and quantity of the imports. Thus, footnote 19, which says that the impact of the unfair practice requires consideration of the price and quantity of the imports,
should not be read to require that the imports cause the in-

JUry.
When using the GATr Codes as an aid for interpreting
Title VII, it is important to decide what weight should be
given to the Codes. The Codes are not self-implementing,
and the 1979 Act states that conflicts between U.S. law and
123. Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. VI, para. 4 (footnote omitted).
See also Antidumping Code, supra note 14, art. III, para. 4 (containing almost identical language).
124. See Easton & Perry, supra note 112, at 47-48 (arguing that footnote
4 of the Antidumping Code, supra note 14, art. III, para. 4, and footnote
19 of the Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. VI, para. 4, which refer to
language about the dumped and subsidized imports, indicate that the effects of the dumping or subsidy are assessed by the effects of the imports).
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the Codes should be resolved in favor of U.S. law.l 25 Nonetheless, Congress enacted the 1979 Act to bring U.S. law
into conformity with the Codes, 126 and there is no indication
in the legislative history that Congress was enacting a law so
seriously at odds with the Codes.

4. Statutory Remedies
The applicable statutory remedies provide further support for the position that the Commission should concentrate on the effects of the unfair practice. The Title VII remedies do not eliminate the harm from the imports entirely,
but only the harm from the unfair practice.l 27 The statute
imposes a duty equal to the magnitude of the unfair practice, 128 which is intended to raise the price of the imports,
not eliminate them. Moreover, Congress has granted the
Commerce Department the authority to settle a case by accepting an agreement to eliminate the dumping or subsidization and, in extraordinary circumstances, to accept agreements that only eliminate the resultant injurious effects.
Thus, it is not necessary for an importer to cease importing
entirely to settle a case}29
I

I,
I

5. Statutory

~f<Poses

Intuitively, it makes no sense to use an all-import standard. The impact of the imports on the competing domestic
producers is measured by the difference between the state
the industry is in today and the state the industry would be in
today if the unfairly-traded imports were excluded from the
U.S. market. Only when there would be no imports but for
the dumping or subsidy would the injury from the imports
be as l.arge as the injury from the unfair practice. There is,
however, no suggestion that Title VII is intended to prevent
imports. Title VII is aimed at two practices-dumping and
subsidization, which Congress believes can injure domestic
125. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 41 (1979).
126. 19 U.S.C. § 2503; H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1979).
127. But see infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
128. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 423.
129. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167lc(b)-(c), 1673c(b)-(c) (1982).
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producers. Therefore, for the purpose of the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws, the Commission should carry
out its statutory directive by assessing whether the dumping
or the subsidy has materially injured the domestic industry,
and not by inquiring into the full effect of the imports. 1 S0

6. Case Law

':

I

The CIT has stated that the Commission is neither required to use the unfair trade margin reported by the Commerce Department in its determinations, nor is it prohibited
from doing so. In two recent cases, Copperweld Corp. v. United
States 131 and Hyundai Pipe Co., Ltd. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission, 132 the CIT held that the Commission may, but
need not, consider the unfair trade margin in assessing causation. In neither of these cases did the CIT rule that Congress intended for the Commission to determine whether the
130. It should be pointed out that the Commission in its review investigations examines the effect of the unfair trade practice. When reviewing
an outstanding order, the Commission predicts how the producers that
are covered by the outstanding antidumping or countervailing duty order
would respond to the order's revocation. It then inquires whether the foreign producers' resulting lower prices and increased exports would materially iJ1iure the domestic producers. The Commission's use of this standard was upheld in American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 269,
271-72 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Commission's approach to causation in review investigations is the mirror image of the economic approach. Consequently, the approach the Commission uses in its review investigations is
inconsistent with the approach it traditionally uses in its final investigations. Thus, on the same facts the Commission could reach both an affirmative determination in a final antidumping or countervailing duty investigation and revoke the order in a review investigation. Such a result is
possible when the imports hold a large share of the market and the margin
of dumping or subsidization is small. In such a case, the imports will have
a large effect on the domestic industry while the unfair practice will have a
small effect.
Of course, the Commission's own procedures cannot take precedence
over the statutory language enacted by Congress. See Cubanski v. Heckler,
794 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski,]., dissenting from rejection of suggestion for rehearing en bane). The lesson to be learned from
the Commission's review investigations is that the unfair practice standard
is intuitively appealing, whereas the alternative approach of looking at the
effects of all imports is not.
131. 682 F. Supp. 552, 558-64 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
132. 670 F. Supp. 357, 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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19

unfair practice injured the domestic industry. 133 Instead, the
CIT reasoned that Title VII directs the Commission to consider certain specific factors, such as price suppression, in
addition to other factors, and that the Commerce Department's unfair trade margins are such an other factor. 1 3 4
Consequently, the reasoning underlying these decisions is
faulty. The unfair trade margin is not one of the effects that
the unfair practice or the imports have on the domestic industry. The answer to the question should the Commission
consider the unfair practice depends on what the statutory
cause is. The statutory cause is either the imports, in which
case the margin should not be used, or the unfair practice, in
which case it should be used. 135
On three occasions the CIT explicitly stated that the
Commission is not required to consider the unfair trade
practice. Although the CIT addressed the proper question
in all of these cases-whether the imports or the unfair practice is the proper statutory cause-its reasoning is not persuasive. In the earliest of the three cases, the CIT merely
stated in dicta that Title VII does not require that the subsidy
cause injury. 136 The second case, Maine Potato Council v.
United States, was the first case to address, and reject, a claim
that the Commission must determine whether the unfair
practice has caused injury. 13 7 The reasoning in Maine Potato
Council is not convincing because the court's opinion ignores
most authority. According to the CIT, the Commission had
looked at the unfair trade margin in only one prior investiga""
tion. 138 The opinion thus ignores a substantial prior practice
by the Commission of looking at unfair trade margins.l39
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133. Copperweld, 682 F. Supp. at 552-77; Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at
357-62.
134. Copperweld, 682 F. Supp. at 560-64; Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at
360.
135. It may be possible for the CIT to conclude that either interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Such ajudgment, however, should not be
made by treating margins as another factor but by concluding that either
interpretation is a reasonable interpretation of what statutory cause is.
136. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 646 (Ct.
lnt'l Trade 1984), vacated on other grounds sub nom., American Lamb Co. v.
United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
137. 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1241-43 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
138. Cf id. at 1242-43.
139. For a discussion of Commission investigations that consider unfair
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The CIT also incorrectly claims that the legislative history of
the 1979 Act was silent on the question of whether the Com140
mission should look at the unfair trade margin.
The only
support for the CIT's holding, other than deference to an
agency's interpretation, is a 1984 House colloquy discussing
the rejection of an amendment, by a Congress subsequent to
the one that enacted Title VII, that would have allowed the
Commission to base its determination [solely] on the size of
the unfair trade margin. 141 The amendment was introduced
to bolster an analytical framework called margins a'halysis,
whereby the Commission would base its determination
solely on the size of the unfair trade margin relative to the
underselling margin. Congress's refusal to endorse margins
analysis, however, does not imply its endorsement of an allimports standard.
Recently, in Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v.
United States, the CIT reaffirmed its holding that the Commission is not required to determine that the subsidy injured the
domestic industry. 142 The CIT's holding in Alberta Pork is
based on three grounds: (1) the language of the statute,
which does not require that the Commission find a causal
connection between the subsidy and injury, 143 (2) the CIT's
interpretation in Hyundai Pipe that the Subsidies Code does
not require a causal connection between the subsidy and injury, 144 and (3) the legislative history.I 45
The first two grounds are discussed above. The CIT's
argument with respect to the legislative history is that there
is a sufficient link between the subsidization and the 46injury
when the subsidized imports cause material injury.I
Actrade margins, see Hyundai Pipe Co. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 670 F. Supp. 357, 361 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1987); Palmeter, supra note
112, at 6-17.
140. Maine Potato Council, 613 F. Supp. at 1243. For a discussion of the
legislative history, see supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
141. Maine Potato Council, 613 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
142. 669 F. Supp. 445, 465-66 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1987).
143. /d. at 465.
144. Id. at 466. In both Hyundai Pipe and Alberta Pork the CIT argued
that the Subsidies Code does not require that the unfair practice cause
injury because of footnote 4 of the Subsidies Code. Cf supra notes 120126 and accompanying text.
145. Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board, 669 F. Supp. at 465-66.
146. /d.

I
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cording to the CIT, the legislative history can be read to imply that it is sufficient if either the imports or the practice
causes injury. Essentially, the CIT reads the legislative history to set up a two-prong test and to require that only one
of the two prongs be met for the Commission to reach an
affirmative determination. However, the effect of the imports is always at least as great as the effect of the unfair
practice. 147 Thus, such an interpretation of the legislative
~ist<;>ry renders irrelevant all references to the practice causmg IOJUry.

C.

The Role of Economics in Assessing Causation

The statute requires causation: the unfair practice must
cause injury. 148 To satisfy this test there must be an actual
connection, which is a question of economics. 149 Congress
did not have to require a causal connection. Congress could
have passed a law requiring that an antidumping duty or
countervailing duty be imposed wherever certain criteria
were met. For example, Congress could have passed a law
requiring that an antidumping or countervailing duty be im14 7. See supra text accompanying note 71.
148. H.R. REP. No. 37, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1979); S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979).
149. Even those who criticize the use of economic analysis in the causation test and believe that the imports, not the unfair practice, are the appropriate causal factor, concede that there must be a causal connection.
See, e.g., Eckes, The Interface ofAntitrust and Trade Laws- Conflict or Harmony?
An lTC Commissioner's Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 417, 422 (1987);Jameson, supra note 67, at 530-50. Commissioners have frequently disagreed
on the role of economic analysis in determining whether the statutory causation standard has been met. For two commissioners' criticisms of the
use of economics in assessing causation, see Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel
Plates and Sheets from Argentina, USITC Pub. 1967, Inv. No. 731-TA175, at 73, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2295, 2317 ( 1987) (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (final, remand); Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, supra note 68, at 15
n.58, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1942 n.58 (Rohr, Comm'r), at 52, 8 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) at 1949 (Eckes, Comm'r). For two commissioners' defenses of their
use of economics in assessing causation, see Color Picture Tubes from
Canada, Japan, Korea, and Singapore, USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 731TA-367 to -370, at 15-32, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1537, 1542-57 (1987)
(Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final); Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and
Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1994, Inv. No. 731-TA-349, at 53-61
(July 1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final); Oil Country Tubular Goods
from Israel, USITC Pub. 1840, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-271 and 731-TA-318, at
21 (Apr. 1986) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary).
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posed if the Commerce Department finds that dumped or
subsidized goods are being imported into the United States,
and the Commission finds that the mean price of the imports
is below the mean price of the domestic like product and that
the market share of the imports has increased by at least 5
percentage points in the last 3 years. Congress, however,
did not pass such a law, or any similar law, but passed instead a law requiring a causal connection. Once the statute
is interpreted to require a causal connection, an interpretation apparently no one has contested, the Commission must
perform an economic analysis to satisfy the statutory directive. The importance of economic analysis in reaching economic conclusions was recently underscored by the Supreme
Court in an antitrust case, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 150 in which the Court held that the petitioners' claim of a conspiracy to monopolize the U.S. consumer electronics market through predatory pricing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act could not survive a motion for summary judgment because the claim was
implausible. In recognizing the important role that economic analysis plays in antitrust law, the Court stated:
It follows from these settled principles that if the
factual context renders respondent's claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must come forward with
more persuasive evidence to support their claim
than would otherwise be necessary. [First National
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253
(1968)] is instructive. The issue in that case was
whether proof of the defendant's refusal to deal
with the plaintiff supported an inference that the
defendant willingly had joined an illegal boycott.
Economic factors strongly suggested that the defendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the
defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed
to create a triable issue. But the refusal to deal had
to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational motive to join the al-

'.
',

150. 475

u.s. 574 (1986).
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leged boycott, and since its refusal to deal was consistent with the defendant's independent interest,
the refusal to deal could not by itself support a finding of antitrust liability. 1 5 1
The legal importance of economic analysis to a case brought
under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which
directly call for an economic analysis, should be at least as
great as that for a case brought under the Sherman Act, with
its less specific directive.
Moreover, once the Commission embarks on an economic analysis of the impact of the unfairly traded imports, it
must perform this analysis properly otherwise it would be
acting arbitrarily and capriciously. As Judge Wald of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has observed:
[W]hatever their differences over the soundness of
particular policies, economists substantially agree
on certain fundamentals of microeconomic theory.
In the long run, supply must equal demand; in a
competitive market, an efficient operator will earn a
reasonable return on invested capital but no more;
investors will seek to maximize profits; and so on.
If, after [a] careful factual inquiry ... ajudge determines that the agency's analysis is inconsistent with
basic microeconomics and that the agency has not
explained (perhaps because it has not noticed) the
discrepancy, the judge may properly conclude that
the agency action is arbitrary and capricious. This
is not to say that an agency cannot reject the prevailing economic wisdom, but courts can properly
insist that the agency do so consciously and explain
why it chose to rely on an unorthodox theory. 152
The proposed economic approach to causation is the
151. /d. at 587.
152. Wald, supra note 11, at 51-52 (footnotes omitted). Judge Wald's
statement addresses the standard of review a court should use in reviewing
an agency's choice of policy. As Judge Wald admits, an agency has less
discretion when the statute requires specific findings of certain economic
facts. /d. at 49. As a consequence, an agency may never appropriately
reject fundamental economic theory when it is making a finding of an economic fact.
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proper way to assess causation because it phrases the question the Commission must address in every investigation in a
way that is capable of satisfYing the statutory standard and
because it uses basic microeconomics to answer that question. The economic approach to causation is capable of determining whether the unfair practice has injured the domestic industry because it uses counterfactuals, assessing causation by comparing the state the industry is in now with the
state the industry would be in but for the unfair practice. If
the domestic industry would be materially better off but for
the unfair practice, then the unfair practice has materially injured the domestic industry. In addition to posing the
proper question, the economic approach can answer this
question because it explicitly uses economic theory to estimate'the economic impact of the unfair practice on the domestic industry. 153
In the last few years several commissioners have unfortunately tended to reject economic analysis in favor of a socalled examination of the facts. 154 The Commission is required to make an economic inquiry about cause and effect.
In any investigation, the parties present arguments to the
Commission, marshal facts, and interpret these facts to support their positions. The critical step in any investigation is
153. On several occasions the CIT has held that the Commission can use
economic elasticity estimates to make its statutory determination. See, e.g.,
Maverick Tube Corp. V; United States, 687 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (Ct. lnt'1
Trade 1988); Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. United States,
683 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); USX Corp. v. United
States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 69 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1988); Alberta Pork Producers'
Marketing Board v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 445, 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987).
154. See, e.g., Sewn Cloth Headwear from the People's Republic of
China, USITC Pub. 2096, Inv. No. 731-TA-405, at 17-38 (July 1988)
(Eckes, Comm'r) (preliminary); Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC
Pub. 2108, lnv. No. 701-TA-224, at 10-13 (Aug. 1988) (Rohr, Comm'r)
(final, remand); Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1818, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-239 and 731-TA-248, at 52, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1949 (1986)
(Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) ("The statute is generally clear, and those of
us charged with administering it have no business substituting academic
fictions for the factual record and our own judgment.") (final); id. at 15
n.58 ("Commissioner Rohr disassociates himself from this analysis of elasticity. He has based his analysis on the actual facts of these investigations
with respect to prices rather than what theory states might or should be
occurring.").
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the interpretation of data. 155 Some theories or concepts
must underlie this analysis, even if in aggregate they go by
the name of common sense. The trouble, and cause for concern, is that an "examination of facts" and "common sense
interpretations" often mask nonsensical assumptions and invalid concepts. 156 As scientists and philosophers of science
have long realized, a correct theory is of substantial practical
value, whereas isolated facts or anecdotes are of little use:
The plain man-1 do not think this is an overstatement-calls a "theory" anything he does not
understand, especially if the conclusions it is used
to support are distasteful to him. . . . It is only because he does not understand "theory" that the
plain man is apt to compare it unfavorably with
"practice," by which he means what he can understand ....
The practical man is apt to sneer at the theorist; but an examination of any of his most firmlyrooted prejudices would show at once that he himself is as much a theorist as the purest and most academic student; theory is a necessary instrument of
thought in disentangling the amazingly complex re155. As Commissioner Liebeler has noted: "Precise analytical tools substitute not for the law, but for seat-of-the-pants judgments about which
data are more important in a particular case." Oil Country Tubular Goods
from Israel, USITC Pub. 1840, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-271 and 731-TA-318, at
21 (Apr. 1986) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary) (footnote omitted).
See also Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, Korea, and Singapore,
USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-367 to -370, at 15-32, 10 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) at 1542-57 (1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final); Certain
Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1994,
Inv. No. 731-TA-349, at 53-61 (July 1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final).
156. The response that the statute requires a legal conclusion that there
is a causal connection rather than an economic conclusion begs the question. Title VII requires a causal connection, which is fundamentally an
economic issue. To say, however, that a legal cause is a broader notion
than an economic cause is inconsistent with the notion of causation. An
analogy to tort law is instructive. In torts, with very few exceptions, the set
of legal causes is a subset of the set of causes-in-fact. See W. PRosSER, LAw
OF TORTS 236-41 (4th ed. 1971). By analogy, causation for the purposes
ofTitle VII cannot extend beyond actual causation. To my knowledge, no
one has suggestedcthat Title VII does not require an actual causal connection.
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lations of the external world. But while his theories
are false because he never tests them properly, the
theories of science are continually under constant
test and only survive if they are true. It is the practical man and not the student of pure science who is
guilty of relying on extravagant speculation, unchecked by comparison with solid fact. 157
As is shown in the next section, the traditional approach is
based on theories that are inconsistent with basic
microeconomics and that are without empirical support.
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This section has advanced three broad arguments: ( 1)
that the Commission should make a unitary determination;
(2) that the unfair practice is the proper causal factor; and (3)
that there must be a causal connection. There is authority
supporting all three arguments. The first two are purely arguments of statutory interpretation. The authority supporting the first argument is overwhelming. There is no support
for bifurcating the determination, and such an approach
should never have been upheld on review. The second argument is more problematic. Although the unfair practice interpretation is the stronger, there is authority for both interpretations. Given the deference usually granted to an
agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering, a commissioner's choice of either causal factor
should probably be upheld on review, as the CIT has done,
albeit on questionable grounds. The crucial third argument,
like the first two, concerns the interpretation of a statute.
However, its ramifications extend beyond the statute and its
interpretation. Since the statute requires a causal connection, the use of economic analysis to assess causation is a
valid exercise of a commissioner's discretion.

I II ~ ·
II
I

i
I

,I I

Ill,

ill,'
II

j·

lr

I

i!

,I
II

I

I I,
1 i1
I

I

I

.I
:1 .1

YEAGER & D. TUERCK, FoREIGN TRADE AND U.S. POLICY: THE
CASE FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 119-20 (1976) (quoting N. CAMPBELL, WHAT IS SCIENCE? 181, 174 (1952)). See also j. KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1936). For one economist's view on the usefulness of anecdotal evidence in economics, see G.
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 17 (3d ed. 1966).
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CRITICISM OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
TO CAUSATION

Because Congress has charged the Commission with interpreting Title VII, the CIT, in reviewing the Commission's
opinions, will accord substantial weight to the Commission's
interpretation of the statute .I 5 8 The Commission's interpretation will be upheld if it is sufficiently reasonable and not
inconsistent with clear legislative intent. 159 The Commission's interpretation need not be the best or the one that the
court would have chosen, as long as it is reasonable. 16o The
Commission's finding that a particular domestic industry is
or is not materially injured, however, will be upheld if it is
supported by substantial evidence on the record. 16 1 Moreover, for its determination to be upheld, the Commission
must supply an analysis of how the factors it relied on support its determination. 162 The Commission must articulate
the rational connection between the factors it is relying on
and its ultimate determination. 163 Thus, to be properly upheld, the Commission's traditional analysis of causation must
be consistent with basic microeconomic principles. If it is
not, the Commission cannot be said to have provided a rational basis for its conclusion.
This section will demonstrate that the Commission's
traditional three-factor analysis of causation is inconsistent
158. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-51
(1978).
159. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001.
160. Id.; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.ll reh 'g denied sub. nom. American Iron and
Steel Institute v. National Resources Defense Council, 468 U.S. 1227
(1984).
161. American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273,
1276 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), ajf'd sub nom., Armco, Inc. v. United States,
760 F.2d 250 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B), as amended by Trade Bill, supra note 53,
§ 1328; USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487,490 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987) (citing SCM Corp. v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 911, 913 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1981)).
163. USX Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 490; see also Budd Co. Railway Division
v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980) (citing
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947)).
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with basic principles of elementary economic analysis. Moreover, the statutory language does not save the traditional
analysis of causation. Thus, the traditional analysis should
be struck down by the Commission's reviewing courts.
A.

Underselling

Underselling is the first factor on which the Commission
traditionally relies. Underselling, which is considered to be
evidence of causation, occurs when the mean price of the imported product is below the mean price of the domestic like
product. The unstated assumption underlying the Commission's analysis of underselling is that consumers facing a
choice between two substitutes will always purchase the less
expensive product. A simple comparison of market prices
would be useful for assessing causation only if consumers behaved this way. But the Commission's use of underselling is
inconsistent with the notion of market equilibrium and with
the observation that imperfect substitutes often sell for different prices. For two substitutes to sell in the same market
at different prices, any differences in quality or in the terms
of sale must equal the difference in the price of the two products for the marginal consumer. 164 If this were not true, only
one of the goods would sell in the market.
Commission investigations have involved many different
kinds of products. In some cases there are important physical differences between the imported and domestic products,
in other cases there are quality differences, and in still other
cases there are differences in the terms of sale. 165 Comparing the price of the imported product to the price of the do164. If one assumes that the domestic like product is more expensive
than the imported product such that there would be underselling, the purchasers of the imported product would be those who find the imported
product to be the better value, while the purchasers of the domestic like
product would be those who find the like product to be the better value.
165. See, e.g., Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate from Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 2032, lnv. No. 731-TA-371, at 12, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 147374 (1987) (final) (quality of domestic product exceeds quality of imported
product); Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 1994, lnv. No. 731-TA-349, at 64-65 Ouly 1987) (Brunsdale,
V. Chairman) (final) (lead time greater for imported than for domestic
product, which accounts for a five to ten percent price difference); Grand
and Upright Pianos from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1599, lnv.
No. 731-TA-204 (Nov. 1984) (preliminary) (physical differences).
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mestic like product, without accounting for such differences,
is meaningless. Admittedly, prices are important to the
Commission's causation analysis. By reducing the relative
price of the imported article, a subsidy will cause some consumers to shift to the imported product. It will also cause
domestic producers to reduce the price of the competing domestic like product. Thus, a subsidy will cause both a reduction in the output of the competing domestic industry and a
decline in the price of the like product. These effects, however, are wholly unrelated to which product undersells the
other.
The Commission has attempted to justify its underselling analysis by relying on the statutory reference to price
undercutting. As a matter of pure statutory interpretation,
the traditional underselling analysis would be unobjectionable. The shortcoming is that the Commission has never explained how its use of underselling is helpful in assessing
causation.
The Commission's traditional use of underselling is not
saved by a provision in the Trade Bill that replaces the
phrase "price undercutting" with the phrase "price underselling."166 The legislative history states that the statute was
amended to make clear that evidence of predatory pricing is
not required; there is no suggestion that Congress was approving any particular approach when it passed this amendment.167
Congress provided little guidance as to what it meant by
the phrase "significant price undercutting." 168 On the other
hand, Congress provided the Commission with substantial
discretion to make its determinations. 169 This discretion,
however, is not unlimited. The Commission must assess
whether there is injury by reason of the unfairly traded imports and not simply whether the imports undersell the domestic like product. Any consideration of underselling must
assist the Commission in assessing causation. In addition,
166. Trade Bill, supra note 53, § 1328.
167. H.R. CoNG. REP. No. 576, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 617, reprinted in
1988 U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 1547, 1649-51.
168. See Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988).
169. Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1244
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
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the Commission must articulate how the factors it relies on,
including underselling, support its determination. 170
Two CIT cases involvitlg underselling are informative.
In British Steel Corp. v. United States, 171 plaintiff, British Steel,
argued that the Commission failed to consider that the costs
incurred by its customers because of long lead times offset
the effect of British Steel's lower prices. The CIT held that
the Commission's analysis was appropriate because the statute does not authorize the Commission to make adjustments
for cost factors. In Maine Potato Council v. United States,I72
plaintiff, Maine Potato Council, argued that the Commission
in reaching its negative determination did not account for
the higher quality of Canadian potatoes in evaluating underselling, price suppression, and lost sales. In remanding the
case, the CIT directed the Commission to take into account
quality differences. 173 The two cases represent different approaches. British Steel is a mechanical approach to the factors
listed by the statute. Maine Potato Council is a less mechanical,
more analytical approach, but it does not go far enough.
More recently, in Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States, 1' 4
the CIT, in upholding the negative determinations of two
commissioners who adhered to the traditional approach,
stated that it was proper for the commissioners "to go beyond merely identifying the presence of underselling to consider whether that underselling is significant in determining
whether there is a causal nexus between imports and injury.''175 The CIT should take a hard look at the Commission's use of underselling. It should address the question
whether a simple comparison of mean prices is probative of
causation. Because such a simple comparison is not proof of
causation, the CIT should reverse decisions that rely on simple comparisons because such comparisons are not in accordance with the law.
In dealing with underselling, the CIT should recognize
that dumping and subsidization injure the domestic industry
170. Trade Bill, supra note 53, § 1328; see USX Corp. v. United States,
655 F. Supp. 487, 490 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
171. 593 F. Supp. 405,412 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
172. 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1245-46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
173. /d. at 1246.
174. 687 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
175. /d. at 1579.
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by lowering the price of the imported product and that competing domestic producers will react to a lower price for the
imported product either by lowering their prices or by making fewer sales, or both. That the average price of the imported product is below the average price of the domestic
like product suggests that producers of the like product may
not have responded to the unfair practice by lowering their
prices. If domestic producers have not reduced their prices
by as much as the importers have, they may be losing sales to
imports because the unfair trade practice has resulted in a
fall in the relative price of the imported article. If the Commission chooses to use underselling instead of directly addressing the question whether the unfair practice has led to a
reduction in sales by the domestic industry, the CIT should
require that the Commission still assess whether the domestic producers have actually had a reduction in sales because
of a fall in the relative price of the imported product. The
CIT should not allow the Commission to base an affirmative
determination on the mere existence of underselling. Such
an approach raises evidence of underselling from its proper
role as a signpost in the investigation beyond the role of an
indicium of injury to the level of the ultimate statutory finding,I76
In contrast to the above use of evidence of underselling,
the Commission's analysis of underselling is inconsistent
with basic microeconomics. This inconsistency has been
brought to its attention many times, 177 yet the Commission
176. Worth noting is that the commissioners who use the traditional underselling analysis also advocate an all-imports standard, while those who
are critical of the traditional use of underselling advocate an unfair-practice standard. Interestingly, the pricing of the imports is irrelevant if an
all-imports standard is used. If the causal factor is the imports, then the
question is how much better the domestic industry would be if the unfair
imports were excluded. How any information about the price of the imports relative to the price of the like product would help to answer this
question is unclear.
Alternatively, if the causal factor is the unfair trade practice, the
proper question is how much better the domestic industry would be if the
imports were fairly priced. In this case, because the counterfactual does
not exclude the imports but simply raises their prices, information about
the relative price of the imports would be useful. Consequently, the price
of the imports is relevant when the unfair practice standard is used, but
not when the all-imports standard is used.
177. See, e.g., Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thai-
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continues to base its determination on the presence or absence of underselling, merely referring to the language on
price undercutting. 178 Such reliance on underselling should
therefore amount to reversible error.t 79
B.

Lost Sales

The second factor that the Commission traditionally emphasizes is lost sales. The sales lost as a result of the unfair
practice are an important element of the injury caused by the
unfair practice. The total sales that would have been made
but for the unfair practice are calculated by taking the difference between the reduction in domestic sales resulting from
the decline in the price of the imports given the price of the
like product and the increase in domestic sales resulting
from the decline in the price of the like product. In addition,
the number of lost sales cannot be greater than the additional imports resulting from the unfair practice.
To assess the number of lost sales through a survey
would be extremely difficult. To make such an assessment,
the Commission would have to obtain a random sample of
purchasers and ask each purchaser the following question:
Would you have purchased the imported product or the domestic like product if the price of the imported product were
its unsubsidized price and the price of the like product were
its fairly-traded price? Assuming that the two unobserved
prices were known to the questioner when he asked the
question and that the respondents' answers were reliable,
then the total sales lost as a result of the unfair practice could
be calculated using the survey and current market-share
data.
land and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1680, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-242 and 731TA-252, -253, at 26 n.7 (Apr. 1985) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary);
Certain Table Wine from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and
Italy, USITC Pub. 1771, lnv. Nos. 701-TA-258 to -260 and 731-TA-283 to
-285, at 34-36, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2657-59 (1985) (Liebeler, V. Chairman) (preliminary); Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936, Inv. Nos. 701-T A267, -268 and 731-TA-304, -305, at 34 n.23, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1771
n.23 (1987) (Brunsdale, V. Chairman) (final).
178. See, e.g., Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1818, lnv.
Nos. 701-TA-239 and 731-TA-248, at 43-44, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1951-52
(1986) (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (final).
179. See supra notes f47-56 and 158-63, and accompanying text.
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There is no reason to expect that the anecdotal lost sales
information collected by the Commission should approximate the number of lost sales. One reason to be skeptical
about the Commission's lost-sales data is that the Commission asks the wrong questions. It is not clear what it means
when a consumer responds affirmatively to the question of
whether price was an important consideration in choosing
which product to purchase. An affirmative answer probably
means that the goods are close substitutes, so the purchase
decision can be affected by small changes in relative price.
Whether two goods are close substitutes, however, is not the
same as saying that a subsidy caused a consumer to shift his
purchase from the domestic product to the imported product. ISO
There are two more reasons to be skeptical about the
Commission's use of lost sales data. First, the Commission
does not use proper sampling and statistical techniques.l 81
Thus, there is no way to generalize from the Commission's
sample about the entire market. Second, there are problems
with using interviews to elicit how consumers really would
have acted in the marketplace had different prices prevailed.182
The CIT does not require that the traditional lost-sales
analysis be used. There is no statutory language that suggests that the Commission perform such an analysis, 183 and
on several occasions the CIT has explicitly held that there is
no such requirement. 184 In addition, the CIT has actually
180. The Commission's traditional lost-sales analysis is even more
troublesome in connection with an all-imports standard. When the imports are the causal factor, the proper question is how much better off the
domestic industry would be if all the imports were excluded from the market. The reasons a consumer gave for purchasing the imported product
would matter little to answer this question. Whether the consumer would
buy the domestic article if the imported article were not available is the
only relevant question.
·
181. See E. Easton, supra note 56, at 15.
182. See Jameson, supra note 67, at 534 (consumers have an economic
incentive to say that their purchases were not lost sales because they are
harmed by duties); E. Easton, supra note 56, at 25-26 (results of surveys
sensitive to how interviewer phrases the questions).
183. See Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 577, 586
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
184. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 572
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been critical of the Commission's use oflost-sales data where
fungible goods are involved, noting that in such an instance
volume may be a better indicator of the sales actually lost. 185
Thus, for the Commission's lost-sales analysis to be upheld,
it must be rationally related to causation, 186 which it is not.
To the contrary, the Commission frequently has been apprised of the weaknesses of its lost-sales analysis. 18 7 Yet the
Commission continues to use this analysis. 188 Consequently,
the CIT should reject the Commission's traditional lost-sales
analysis. 189
C.

Trends and Correlations

The third factor that the Commission traditionally em-'
phasizes is import trends. The Commission has looked for
trends in the volume and market penetration of the imports
under investigation and correlations between those trends
and various indicia of the health of the industry. The existence of a trend in the quantity and market penetration of the
imports over time is of questionable relevance. That imports
are increasing says nothing about the effect of the unfair
practice because imports may be increasing for a variety of
reasons that have nothing to do with the unfair practice. Alternatively, treating the imports as the causal factor, it is not
clear why the trend in imports, and not the level of imports,
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Gifford-Hill Cement, 615 F. Supp. at 585-86; Maine
Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985).
185. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill Cement, 615 F. Supp. at 586.
186. See Lone Star Steel Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 183, 186 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986) ("[I]nstances of lost sales alone do not inandate a finding of injury; rather it is for ITC to determine whether lost sales, together
with other factors, indicate a causal nexus between LTFV imports and material injury to the domestic industry.").
187. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill Cement, 615 F. Supp. at 586 ("Where fungible
goods are concerned, volume may be the best indicator of lost sales rather
than the anecdotal evidence obtained in the typical lost sales study." (footnote omitted)); Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes
and Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 12
n.28, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1782 n.28 (1986) (Stem, Chairwoman, Liebeler,
V. Chairman, & Brunsdale, Comm'r) (final).
188. See, e.g., Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and
Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269 and 731-TA-311, -312,
-315, at 15,9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1706 (1986) (final).
189. See supra notes 14 7-56 and 158-63, and accompanying text.
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would be relevant. For under this formulation of the statutory test, it is the imports and not the increase in imports
that is the statutory cause.l 90
The Commission's use of correlation analysis is also on
a shaky foundation. Any decline in the fortunes of an industry over time can be attributable to a single unfair practice
only if two conditions hold. First, the imports must not have
been dumped or subsidized at the benchmark date. Second,
since the benchmark date there must have been no changes
other than the introduction of the dumping or the subsidy
that have affected the industry. If these two conditions do
not hold, there would be no reason to expect that any decline in the condition of the industry could be attributed to
the unfair practice and not to any other cause. Unfortunately, the Commission looks for a correlation between imports and various indicia of the condition of the industry in
just about every case, without any attempt to ensure that
these two conditions are met. 191
When the Commission relies on correlation analysis to
make its determination, there is a chance that it will make a
negative determination even though the impact of the unfair
practice is material, because the adverse impact of the unfair
practice may be outweighed by the positive impact of other
causes, such as a decline in input prices or an increase in
demand. Alternatively, the Commission might make an affirmative determination even when the impact of the unfair
practice is not material, because other causes may have had a
materially adverse impact on the domestic industry. An additional problem with the use of import trends and correla190. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253
(1982)), which implements the GATT Escape Clause, empowers the Commission to make a recommendation to the President for relief if an increase in imports is a substantial cause of serious injury to a competing
domestic industry. Title VII, however, is concerned with dumping and
subsidies, not increased imports.
191. Treating the imports as the causal factor, correlation analysis is appropriate only if there were, first, no imports at the benchmark date, and
second, no changes affecting the domestic industry after the benchmark
date that could be attributed to causes other than the imports. The first
condition can be corrected by extrapolation if the level of imports at the
benchmark date is known. The second condition, however, cannot be ignored, nor can it be corrected by simple extrapolation. It undermines any
determination based on correlations, regardless of the causal factor.
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tion analysis is that they implicitly assume that the domestic
industry was not materially injured by reason of unfair imports at the benchmark date. For example, the industry
might have been materially injured by reason of unfair imports at the benchmark date, and there might have been no
change in the condition of the industry or the market penetration of the imports since that date. In such a case, the
Commission should make an affirmative determination, but
an examination of trends or correlation analysis would suggest otherwise.
The statute does not support the Commission's traditional use of trends and correlations. Although the statute
suggests that the Commission look at various trends, this
does not imply that a trend or correlation by itself is evidence of a causal connection. For the Commission's use of
trends and correlations to be upheld, it still must be rationally related to causation. This it is not. The shortcomings of
the Commission's analysis of trends have been brought to its
attention, 192 yet the Commission's reliance on trends continues. Consequently, the CIT should reject the Commission's
traditional analysis of trends.I93

D. Summary
The Commission has traditionally emphasized three
kinds of data in assessing causation, each one of which is
based on economic misconceptions. The Commission's
analysis of causation is thus seriously flawed, and its conclusions are probably often wrong. 194 Moreover, the traditional
approach cannot be saved by an appeal to the statutory language. Therefore, because the Commission's traditional approach to causation cannot assess the economic impact that
either the unfair practice or the imports have had on the domestic industry, the Commissioners who use it do not have a
proper base on which to render a judgment whether the domestic industry has been materially injured by reason of the
192. Nitrile Rubber from Japan, USITC Pub. 2090, lnv. No. 731-TA384, at 32-37 (June 1988) (Cass, Comm'r) (final).
193. See supra notes 147-56 and 158-63, and accompanying text.
194. In addition to the conceptual problems with the Commission's causation analysis, there are serious problems with the data that the Commission collects and analyzes. For a critique of the Commission's data collection procedures, see E. Easton, supra note 56, at 14-26.
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imports. Therefore, the traditional approach should be
struck down by the Commission's reviewing courts.
VII.

THE MEASUREMENT OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICE

Even if the Commission wanted to, it would be difficult
for it to apply precisely the proposed economic approach to
injury in every investigation. This is because there are substantial problems with the Commerce Department's measurement of the dumping and subsidy margins that would
make it difficult to implement an analytically correct framework for determining injury. As calculated by the Commerce
Department, the dumping and subsidy margins contain biases that generally, but not always, overestimate the size of
the unfair practice. 195 Therefore, if the Commission were to
use the Commerce Department's calculations of the dumping and subsidy margins in its own investigations as estimates of the shifts in the import supply curves, the Commission would generally be led to overestimate the injury caused
by the unfair practice. A discussion of the biases in the Commerce Department's calculation of subsidy and dumping
margins follows.
A.

Subsidy Margins

A subsidy injures competing domestic producers by
driving down the import supply curve; the injury to U.S. producers from a subsidy depends, in part, on the size of this
shift. The purpose of the countervailing duty law is to protect competing domestic producers from the adverse effects
of the subsidy, and the impact of the subsidy depends not on
the size of the subsidy but on the size of the shift in the import supply curve. Thus, the theoretically correct way to
measure a subsidy is by the shift in the import supply
195. For a discussion of statistical biases in the Commerce Department's
calculation of dumping margins, see R. Boltuck, Creative Statistics: Biases
in the Commerce Department's Calculation of Dumping Margins (July 10,
1987) (available in the author's file at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York University School of Law); seeR. Diamond,
A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of
U.S. Countervailing Duty Law (March 23, 1990) (available in the author's
file at the offices of the journal of International Law and Politics, New York
University School of Law).
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curve. 196 The Commerce Department, however, does not
measure a subsidy by the shift in the import supply curve,
but by the value of the subsidy to the recipient. 197 In the
case of a subsidy that is fully passed through, these two
measures will be the same, but with other subsidies they will
differ. For example, for a subsidy to a factor of production,
which induces substitution in favor of that factor, the amount
of the subsidy exceeds the shift in the import supply
curve. 198 For a nonrecurring subsidy, such as a loan guarantee, it would be very difficult to determine what, if any, effect
the subsidy has had on the import supply curve. In such
cases, Congress has directed that the Commerce Department
allocate the value of the net subsidy over time on the basis of
the commercial and competitive benefit to the recipient. 199
Nonetheless, the value of the net subsidy, however allocated
over time, may have no relation to the impact of the subsidy
on the import supply curve.
There is a practical reason for measuring a subsidy by its
value to the recipient. In many cases it would be very difficult for the Commerce Department to ascertain how the subsidy has affected the import supply curve. Such an assessment would be especially difficult with subsidized imports
from countries where there is so close a relationship between
government and industry that government policies are carried out through consensus and persuasion instead of
through regulation and litigation. In such an instance, it
would be difficult to know how the subsidy affected the recip-
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196. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 77, at 21-25. See also supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
197. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a)(1), 1677(5), (6) (1982). Congress rejected
the idea that the indirect costs of a subsidy to a firm, such as the higher
freight costs of moving to a disadvantaged area, could be used to offset the
size ofthe subsidy. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1979); S.
REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 471-72.
198. Memorandum from Industry Economist, supra note 41, at 2-3. See
also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
199. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979); S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 471-72. For a general discussion of the use of loans as
subsidies, see Jameson, The Administration of U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws
with Regard to Domestic Subsidies, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 59, 110-18
(1985), and Sandler, supra note 18, at 770-71.

:I

110

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 22:37

ient's production and exports to the United States. In addition, such an approach would encourage foreign governments and producers to claim that the subsidy did not shift
the recipient's excess supply curve to the United States, but
instead was used to defray the recipient's fixed costs of production. In conclusion, other than for practical reasons of
measurement, it is difficult to find a theoretical reason for
measuring a subsidy by its size instead of by its effect on the
import supply curve. Nonetheless, in spite of the logically
weak foundation on which it is based, the Commerce Department measures a subsidy not by its effect on the import supply curve, but by its value to the recipient.
B.

Dumping Margins

There are also substantial problems with the measurement of dumping margins. However, unlike with subsidies,
where an analytically incorrect definition of the magnitude of
the subsidy is called for by Congress, the calculation of
dumping margins is filled with computational biases introduced by the Commerce Department that tend to increase
the margins.
The statute and legislative history provide little guidance on how to measure dumping, thereby leaving the
Commerce Department largely on its own. The method developed by the Commerce Department to calculate a dumping margin is as follows. The Commerce Department begins
its calculation of the dumping margin with the foreign producer's cost of production. Sales at prices above the foreign
producer's total cost of production are used to determine
the fair value of the product, 200 which is just the mean of
200. The statute directs Commerce to exclude sales made at prices that
would not permit the recovery of all costs within a reasonable time in the
ordinary course of trade if such sales have been made over an extended
period of time and in substantial quantities. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982);
19 C.F .R. § 353.51 (a) ( 1989). If there are insufficient sales above the producer's full cost of production, then Commerce will calculate fair value by
using third country sales or a constructed value. For a discussion of the
different methods Commerce uses to calculate fair value, see Kaplan,
Kamarack, & Parker, Cost Analysis Under the Antidumping Law, 3 G.W J. Int'l
L. & Econ. 357 (1988); Bryan & Boursereau, Antidumping Law in the European Communities and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 18 J. INT'L L. &
EcoN. 631, 670-76 (1985).
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such sales. Each individual U.S. sale is compared to this
mean. Sales at prices below this mean are assessed an
amount less than fair value ("LTFV"). Sales at prices above
the mean are assessed an amount LTFV of zero. The mean
value of the resulting LTFV amounts expressed as a percentage of the mean price of all U.S. sales constitutes the dumping margin. 201 The dumping margin as so calculated overstates the amount of price discrimination between the exporter's home market and the U.S. market because of the
exclusion of some home market sales and because of the unusual averaging technique.2o2
Furthermore, putting to one side the computational difficulties in the calculation of dumping margins, injury to an
industry caused by dumping remains very difficult to define.
Unlike a subsidy, where there is generally a direct relationship between the size of the subsidy and the size of the injury, no such relationship exists between dumping and injury. Dumping, as previously described, most commonly
takes the form of price discrimination, 203 and a higher homemarket price may have no effect on the competing U.S. industry.204 Even so, the statutory directive-that the Commission determine whether the domestic industry is injured
by the dumping-requires that the Commission use some
kind of injury test.
Title VII defines dumping as sales in the United States
of merchandise at less than fair value. Fair value is the price
in the home market of merchandise that is similar to the merchandise alleged to be dumped in the United States. Thus,
one way for the Commission to carry out the Congressional
directive would he to measure the injury from dumping by
how much better off the domestic industry would be if the
201. See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 6, at 506; Sandler, supra note
18, at 763-65.
202. Although Title VII authorizes Commerce to use statistically proper
averaging and sampling techniques, Commerce has generally declined to
use proper statistical techniques in its calculation of dumping margins. It
has also mechanically excluded sales made at less than the cost of production from the calculation of foreign market value without properly considering product development cycles or demand cycles.
203. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
204. See Boltuck, supra note 26, at 48-50; Knoll, United States Antidumping
Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX. INT'L LJ. 265, 285-87 (1987).
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foreign producers were constrained to sell their product in
the United States at the then prevailing fair value. Using
such. an injury test, and ignoring the Commerce Department's computational errors, is equivalent to asking how
much better off the domestic industry would be if the U.S.
price of the dumped imports were increased to eliminate the
price discrimination.
It is worth noting that an antidumping duty may not entirely eliminate the effect of selling at less than fair value
when the foreign producers under investigation are engaging in price discrimination. The remedy afforded by Title
VII is an antidumping duty equal to the margin of dumping. 205 The amount of the duty is calculated at the end of the
year for all of the sales made in the preceding year. 206 Thus,
a foreign manufacturer can reduce the duty it will pay either
by increasing its U.S. price or by decreasing its home-market
price. In general, an antidumping duty will completely integrate the two markets and will cause each affected foreign
producer engaging in price discrimination to raise its U.S.
price and lower its home-market price. Each producer's resulting after-tariff price will lie between the producer's initial
U.S. and home-market prices. Thus, the imposition of an antidumping duty will not cause the affected foreign producer
to raise its U.S. price to the original "fair value," but to raise
its U.S. price to a lesser amount and lower its home-market
price to that same amount. Thus, a second way to measure
the injury from dumping is by comparing the current state of
the industry to the state the industry would be in if relief
were granted and the U.S. and home markets were integrated.207 When such an approach is used (and ignoring the
statistical biases inherent in the Commerce Department's
method of calculating dumping margins), the amount of
205. 19 u.s.c. § 1673 (1982).
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.53, 355.41 (1988).
An importer of merchandise subject to an outstanding antidumping or
countervailing duty order is required to make a deposit covering the estimated antidumping or countervailing duty. 19 U.S.C. § 167l(e)(a)(3)
(1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.48(a)(3), 355.36(c) (1988).
207. See Boltuck, supra note 26, at 48-50. This is the comparison that the
Comparative Analysis of the Domestic Industry Condition or CADIC
model makes. This model was developed by Richard Boltuck of the Commission's Office of Economics, and its results are reported to the Commission in every antidumping and countervailing duty investigation.
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price discrimination will exceed the effect an antidumping
duty would have on the U.S. price of the imported product.
C.

Estimating the Effect of the Unfair Practice on the Import
Supply Curve

In Section II.B., I said that this Article would concentrate on full pass-through subsidies because the proposed
economic approach to causation works exactly only for such
subsidies, assuming that the Commission is constrained to
use the Commerce Department's calculation of the magnitude of the unfair practice for its estimate of the effect the
unfair practice has had on the import supply curve. This is
because only the Commerce Department's calculation of the
size of such a subsidy is an economically correct calculation
of the effect of the unfair practice on the import supply
curve. Although the Commerce Department's calculation of
a dumping or subsidy margin will be used to calculate any
offsetting duty, it is less clear that the Commission is constrained to use the Commerce Department's margin calculation without modification in its injury determination as an
estimate of the effect the unfair practice has had on the import supply curve. Historically, the Commission has been
unwilling to modify the Commerce Department's calculations to estimate the effect of the unfair trade practice on the
import supply curve.2°8 Even so, there are arguments to be
made that the Commission should not blindly accept the
Commerce Department's margins calculations as an estimate
of the shift caused by the unfair trade practice.
Congress requires the Commission to assess the impact
of the dumping or subsidy. 209 To comply with this directive,
the Commission will have to calculate the effect of the unfair
practice on the import supply curve. Nowhere is the Commission told that it cannot make this calculation simply because a separate agency, the Commerce Department, must
calculate the antidumping and countervailing duty margins.
208. See Memorandum from the General Counsel, supra note 63, at 9.
But see New Steel Rails from Canada, USITC Pub. 2217, Inv. No. 701-TA297 & 731-TA-422, at 185-89 (Sept. 1989) (Cass, V. Chairman, dissent)
(final) (Commission constrained to accept dumping margin as measure of
dumping but not as measure of price discrimination).
209. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
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To the contrary, the legislative history from the Customs
Simplification Act of 1954 indicates that the antidumping in. jury determination was transferred from the Treasury, which
at the time also calculated dumping margins, because such
determinations were similar to those made by the Commission under another statute and because Treasury was not
staffed to make such determinations. 210 Moreover, Title VII
provides that the Commerce Department is to make available
to the Commission the information that it has gathered. 211
If the Commission can calculate the effect the unfair practice
has had on the import supply curve, then the ability of the
Commission to carry out the proposed analysis would only
be limited by the quality of the data, the attention and time
given the matter, and the power of the available statistical
and econometric techniques.2I2
Although it may be argued that the Commission can, .
and perhaps should, in each case estimate the shift in the '
import supply curve, if the Commission is unwilling or unable to make this estimate itself, it should use the Commerce
Department's margin calculations as an estimate of this shift.
Critics of the Commission's use of margins argue, inter alia,
that the Commission should not consider margins at all since
the Commerce Department's calculations are wrong. These
critics argue that the Commission should instead consider
whether the imports and not the unfair trade practice has injured the domestic industry. 213 Such an argument implicitly
assumes that there would be no imports but for the unfair
trade practice. However, estimating the shift of the import
210. S. REP. No. 2326, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 3900, 3901; H.R. REP. No. 2453, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1954).
211. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167la(d), 1673a(d) (1982).
212. The argument that the Commission should look beyond Commerce's margins and estimate the impact of the unfair practice on the import supply curve might be stronger for antidumping duty investigations
than for countervailing duty investigations. The biases in Commerce's
dumping margins result from Commerce's method of calculating the margins, whereas the biases in Commerce's subsidy margins result from the
method intended by Congress.
213. E.g., Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and
Tubes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254, at 28-29, 8
I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1786-87 (Eckes, Comm'r, dissenting) (final); Easton &
Perry, supra note 112, at 39-47.
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supply curve according to the Commerce Department's margins would be more accurate than simply assuming that but
for the unfair trade practice there would have been no imports. Consequently, because the Commission should assess
the impact of the unfair practice as best it can, given the constraints it faces, the Commission, if it is unwilling or unable
to estimate the effect that the unfair practice has had on the
import supply curve, should use the Commerce Department's calculations of margins as an estimate of this shift.

VIII.

CoNcLUSION

The antidumping and countervailing duty laws are
aimed at two practices that Congress believes can injure domestic producers: dumping by foreign companies of merchandise in the United States and subsidies provided by foreign governments to producers that export merchandise to
the United States. 214 In enacting the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, Congress walked a narrow path between
the interests of consumers, importers, and foreign producers
on the one hand and domestic producers on the other hand.
Congress neither chose to allow unrestricted importation of
dumped and subsidized goods, nor did it choose to exclude
all dumped and subsidized goods from the United States.
Instead, Congress attempted to tailor a remedy to fit a definite perceived evil. 215 In carrying out the congressional directive to grant relief to domestic producers who are so injured, the Commission should determine whether the unfair
practice has injured the domestic industry. In order to protect domestic producers from the effects of dumping and
subsidization as Congress intended, it is unnecessary for the
Commission to consider the full impact of the unfairly traded
imports, yet alone the full impact of fairly and unfairly traded
imports together. On the other hand, by requiring that the
domestic industry be in an absolute state of injury, the Commission has added a requirement for relief that is not in the
214. SeeS. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 37, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CoDE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 423.

215. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 46 (1979) ("[Title VII)
is a remedy targeted at a specific type of injury caused by unfair import
competition, and the Committee expects it to be administered in that context.").
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statute and that is inconsistent with the statute's purpose of
protecting competing domestic industries from the adverse
effects of dumping and subsidies.
Furthermore, in order to grant relief to domestic industries that are injured by reason of dumped and subsidized
imports (and only to such industries), the Commission must
find a causal connection. Whatever causal factor the Commission uses when it makes its statutory determination,
either the imports or the unfair practice, and regardless of
whether the Commission also uses an absolute standard of
injury, a causal connection must exist between the causal factor and the condition of the domestic industry. Causation is
not a matter of statutory interpretation, as are the decisions
whether or not to bifurcate the determination and what
cause to consider, but is a matter of economics. 216 The law
requires causation, and this requires an economic analysisan analysis that the Commission has traditionally refused to
applr and that its reviewing courts have generally failed to
reqmre.

216. Questions of interpretation involving causation still remain. There
are several, such as how much injury is required, who has the burden of
proof, and how the Commission should measure injury. See, e.g., supra
notes 112-14 7 and accompanying text (argument that the unfair practice is
the appropriate causal factor). The point is that once these and any other
questions of interpretation are resolved, there remains a core economic
question: is the Commission sufficiently sure that the appropriate causal
factor has had a substantial enough adverse effect on the relevant parties?

